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We examine if junior debtholders monitor banks and if such monitoring constrains risk-taking. 
Leveraging an unexplored natural experiment in the U.S. that changes the priority structure of claims 
on failed banks’ assets, we provide novel insights into the debate on market discipline. We document 
asymmetric effects for monitoring effort depending on whether a creditor class moves up or down the 
priority ladder. Conferring priority to all depositors causes declines in deposit interest rates but 
increases interest rates for non-deposit liabilities, suggesting greater incentives for junior debtholders 
to exert monitoring effort. Consistent with the idea that senior claims require lower risk premiums, 
banks increasingly rely on deposit funding following changes in priority structure. More intensive 
monitoring also influences conduct: subordinating non-depositor claims reduces risk taking. Our 
results inform the debate about bail-ins and highlight that changes in the priority structure are a 
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1. Introduction  
Modern finance theory states that debt priority has important implications for monitoring incentives. 
Conferring priority on one group of debtholders exposes junior claimants to greater losses in the event 
of bankruptcy, leading them to increase ex ante monitoring efforts. Exploiting a hitherto unexplored 
natural experiment in the U.S. banking industry, we provide novel insights into how market 
participants monitor and influence bank conduct following exogenous changes to the debt priority 
structure. 
Market discipline, the idea that participants in financial markets can effectively monitor bank 
conduct and constrain risk taking, has been a cornerstone of the financial safety net for many years. 
The concept of harnessing market forces for regulatory purposes has also received considerable 
attention in the literature (e.g., Flannery (2001)). The mechanism works as follows: Private investors, 
in particular holders of large debt claims have strong incentives to monitor banks’ risk exposure 
because their claims are not protected by deposit insurance (Flannery and Sorescu (1996)). 
Consequently, they have more to lose if a bank fails and are therefore more likely to respond to 
impending problems. Such responses may come in the form of withdrawal of funds, refusing to roll 
over funds, demanding a higher risk premium, demanding collateral, or combinations thereof. 
Ultimately, these actions put constraints on the risk-taking behavior of banks, in particular asset 
allocation choices (Goldberg and Hudgins (2002)).   
However, the jury is still out on whether private sector agents reliably engage in risk monitoring and 
preventative influence of bank behavior.
1
 In terms of the monitoring dimension of market discipline, 
Flannery and Sorescu (1996) present evidence that investors monitor banks and can distinguish 
between risky and sound banking firms. Similarly, Martinez Peria and Schmukler (2001) find that 
depositors punish banks for risky conduct. On the other hand, Krishnan, Ritchken, and Thomson 
(2005) challenge these conclusions. The opinions regarding the preventative influence of market 
discipline also diverge. Bliss and Flannery (2000) argue that evidence for the influencing dimension of 
market discipline is virtually absent. This view finds empirical support in research by Billet, Garfinkel, 
and O’Neal (1998), and Krishnan, Ritchken, and Thomson (2005). In contrast, Ashcraft (2008) 
challenges these inferences. He documents that market participants can indeed influence bank 
behavior, in particular when investors can impose real constraints on banks.      
In this paper, we take advantage of a largely unknown natural experiment to contribute to the 
unresolved debate about the efficacy of market discipline. At the heart of our identification strategy 
lies the staggered introduction of depositor preference legislation in 15 U.S. states between 1983 and 
1993, explained in detail in Section 2 below. Depositor preference laws change the claim structure on 
a failed bank’s assets by assigning a priority claim to depositors and subordinates non-depositors. 
We investigate if debt seniority differentially affects monitoring incentives of different creditor 
classes and if monitoring by creditors also influences bank conduct. Economic intuition and prior 
work by Birchler (2000) suggest this is the case. Subordinating claims of general creditors to those of 
depositors eradicates costly duplication of monitoring effort when investors differ with respect to 
privately known information costs because non-depositors have more efficient monitoring 
technologies. Consequently, monitoring is reallocated towards the more efficient monitors, i.e., non-
depositors. Depositors therefore require a lower interest rate which reduces funding costs and 
translates into higher bank profits. Simultaneously, the increase in monitoring should also incentivize 
bank management to adopt less risky strategies.
2
 In short, the introduction of depositor preference laws 
and the concomitant changes in claim structure give rise to a rich set of empirical predictions for 
funding costs, liability structure, profitability, and soundness. This is the focus of our study. 
                                                          
1
  The debate about market discipline has received renewed attention in the aftermath of the recent financial crisis. Several observers note 
that the widely deployed government interventions such as blanket guarantees, liquidity support, capital support measures, and 
nationalizations undermine market discipline (e.g., Acharya and Kulkarni, 2014; Acharya, Anginer, and Warburton (2014); Calderon 
and Schaeck (forthcoming)).  




Our empirical setting is uniquely suited to draw causal inferences for the effect of the seniority of 
debt claims on bank conduct by exploiting variation across states over time in the introduction of 
depositor preference laws. In doing so, we overcome the typical identification challenges by 
establishing a valid counterfactual. The successive adoption of depositor preference legislation by 15 
states constitutes a plausibly exogenous change in the monitoring incentives of non-depositors that 
only applies to state-chartered but not to nationally-chartered banks. This fact, together with the panel 
structure of our data with quarterly frequency, aids construction of the implied counterfactual.  
We use difference-in-difference estimations that compare the evolution of the key dependent 
variables among state-chartered banks with an observationally similar control group of nationally-
chartered banks that are headquartered in the same state but are unaffected by the laws. We include 
bank fixed effects that rule out unobserved time-invariant effects in the cross-section, and we include 
state-quarter fixed effects that net out any time-varying unobservable heterogeneity on the state-
quarter level. In other words, our treatment effect simply represents the average difference between 
state-chartered and nationally-chartered banks in the same state-quarter, i.e., banks that operate in an 
identical macroeconomic environment. These design choices ensure that, conditional on additional 
covariates, the key identifying assumption that banks in the treatment and control groups are only 
randomly different is met. 
One may ask whether the introduction of depositor preference is truly exogenous with respect to 
bank behavior. To alleviate concerns about the exogeneity of treatment, we survey the state legislative 
councils, read the legislative council’s digests, the concurrencies of the state amendments and the 
assembly laws in all 15 U.S. states that adopt depositor preference during the sample period prior to 
embarking upon our econometric analyses. In addition, we screen a variety of press sources to gain an 
overview on the macroeconomic setting and the driving forces behind the adoption of depositor 
preference laws. This preliminary investigation decisively refutes the idea that banking sector 
conditions affect the introduction of depositor preference. We also do not find that macroeconomic 
developments correlate in any way with the adoption of these laws. The plausible exogeneity of 
depositor preference is also reflected in a set of empirical tests that model the adoption of depositor 
preference laws as a function of variables that provide information about the soundness and other 
characteristics of the 15 states’ banking systems. Similar tests in the style of Kroszner and Strahan 
(1999) also reject the view that private-interest groups lobby for the introduction of depositor 
preference.  
However, demonstrating that adopting depositor preference is orthogonal to the outcomes we study 
is not sufficient to establish causality. We must also show that our control group constitutes a valid 
counterfactual. We therefore present visual evidence that our data support the assumption of parallel 
trends between treatment and control group in the periods prior to the enactment of depositor 
preference legislation. These tests highlight that, in the absence of depositor preference laws, the key 
metrics we are interested in for both state-chartered and nationally-chartered banks would have 
evolved similarly. Subsequent empirical tests lend further support to this assumption. 
We obtain the following key findings. Depositor preference laws provoke asymmetric monitoring 
responses depending on whether a creditor class moves up or down the priority ladder. Conferring 
seniority upon uninsured deposits causes a significant decrease in deposit interest expenses. By 
comparison, interest on non-deposits increase, reflecting their more junior status and greater ex ante 
incentive to monitor bank behavior to curtail losses in the event of bankruptcy. The overall effect of 
these changes is a 1.5% reduction in funding costs due to the composition of liabilities being more 
heavily weighted toward deposits.  
Beyond documenting an important pricing effect for banks’ cost of funds, we also isolate the 
quantity effects of priority changes. Consistent with the fact that insured depositors’ position in the 
priority queue is unaffected by the law, we observe no change in state-chartered banks’ market share 
of insured deposits. However, we do uncover a significant increase in state-chartered banks’ share of 
uninsured deposits post treatment. This effect is consistent with uninsured depositors demanding a 
lower risk premium following their elevation in priority and a corresponding increase in the supply of 
uninsured deposits to state-chartered banks by risk-averse agents. Interestingly, we find that depositor 
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preference laws have no effect on state-chartered banks’ non-deposit market share. This suggests that 
part of the reason non-depositors increase monitoring is because they have the same amount of skin in 
the game. Put differently, had we found the laws to cause a decrease in non-deposits’ market share it 
would be difficult to claim that non-depositors engage in more monitoring given they divest their 
holdings. 
Do these changes in monitoring actually influence bank behavior in terms of risk taking and 
profitability? Our tests suggest they do. The average state-chartered bank’s Z-score (ln) increases by 
22%, and non-performing loans ratios and leverage also improve.
3
 Thus, subordinating claims of 
private agents with efficient monitoring technologies causes significant improvements in soundness. 
We also find improvements in profitability: the average state bank’s return on equity increases by 4%.  
Are the effects we attribute to changes in the priority of the claim structure really causal? Using 
bank-fixed effects that net out any unobserved time-invariant bank-specific heterogeneity mitigates 
omitted variable concerns. Likewise, state-quarter-fixed effects capture time-varying shocks, such as 
declines in demand and changes to tax rates and regulation that are common to both treated and 
untreated banks but differ across states, further alleviate problems that originate from omitted 
variables. In addition, time-varying bank-specific control variables purge the remaining realistic 
omitted variable threats. However, isolating the effect of depositor preference legislation requires that 
the changes in bank behavior can only be observed when depositor preference laws are introduced, 
and, moreover, that no other developments coincide temporarily with the adoption of depositor 
preference laws that could also trigger adjustments in banks’ behavior. To address these issues, we 
offer a set of placebo regressions, where we randomly assign placebo depositor preference laws to 
nationally-chartered banks located in states where state-chartered banks were subject to depositor 
preference and find indeed that our placebo tests remain statistically indistinguishable from zero. The 
fact that we have 15 different instances of treatment occurring at different points in time makes it 
challenging to identify other potential confounds. Any omitted variable would have to temporarily 
coincide with the adoption of depositor preference and simultaneously only affect state-chartered 
banks. We discuss such potential confounds that occur simultaneously with the introduction of 
depositor preference in detail and present tests that rule out these alternative explanations. Specifically, 
we document that the banking turmoil in the S&L industry, regional banking problems in Texas and 
New England, and the regulatory changes that come in the form of FIRREA and FDICIA do not drive 
for our findings. We also rule out that the wave of branching deregulation on the interstate and the 
intrastate level and charter switches play a role for our inferences. Tests that exploit the subsequent 
introduction of national depositor preference in 1993 help us demonstrate the external validity of our 
inferences.   
Our findings are important for two reasons. First, the direct evidence that monitoring by junior 
claimholders translates in a corresponding improvement in bank soundness provides a rationale for 
market discipline being an integral component in the regulatory framework. Our inferences are 
consistent with Flannery (1998; 2001) who advocates that private sector agents can effectively 
monitor financial firms. In contrast, our results counter concerns raised in recent work by Acharya, 
Anginer, and Warburton (2014) that market discipline has lost much of its appeal in the years after the 
crisis. Furthermore, our evidence mirrors findings in the corporate finance literature by Rajan and 
Winton (1995). They show loan contracts need to be structured in a way to provide incentives for the 
lender to monitor the borrower. We illustrate that assigning priority claims to depositors can be viewed 
as an alternative to contractual devices to motivate such monitoring in the context of banking 
regulation.  
Second, the findings we obtain provide timely new insights for policy and regulation. Assigning 
priority to some or all deposits in case of bankruptcy of a bank has been one of the early ways of 
protecting depositors. The U.S. and a few other countries already have some form of depositor 
preference in place but this policy tool received little attention in the past few decades. However, a 
lively debate about the pros and cons of such legislation was sparked off in the aftermath of the 
financial crisis with policymakers and academics advocating the use of bail-in provisions where 
                                                          
3  In this study, we define leverage as the ratio of debt to equity.  
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debtholders contribute to bank resolutions (Flannery (2010)). The European Central Bank called for 
the introduction of depositor preference laws in all member states of the European Union, and the 
Independent Commission on Banking in the UK also recommended the introduction of such laws. 
Policy makers favor adopting such laws on the grounds that they prevent bank runs, improve market 
discipline, and enhance soundness. However, they meet resistance from the banking industry whose 
representatives are concerned that such laws increase funding costs. In the absence of prior conclusive 
evidence on these questions, our work sheds new light into this debate and aids policy formulation.  
Prior to summarizing our contribution, we briefly reflect on the fact that our inferences are based on 
data for U.S. banks obtained during the 1980s and early 1990s. We also discuss the extent to which we 
can generalize from our findings. Beyond highlighting that the banks in the 15 states that adopt 
depositor preference legislation are statistically indistinguishable from the population of banks in the 
U.S., we point out that our natural experiment also matters quantitatively. Banks in the 15 states that 
enter our main analysis account for 53 percent of total banking system assets in the U.S. State-
chartered banks hold 47 percent of total banking system assets in these 15 states. The share of 
uninsured deposits in these banks is 9 percent of total liabilities, and non-deposits account for 15 
percent of total liabilities.
4
 In other words, more than 24 percent of the liability side of a banks’ 
balance sheet is affected by these laws.  
In addition, we believe that there are other reasons for why our results are useful to inform the 
debate about market discipline in the U.S. and abroad. In fact, our experiment sheds light on how a 
banking system with many small and medium sized banks which operate in relatively small 
geographic markets on the one hand and a limited number of very large institutions on the other hand 
responds to an exogenous shock that increases monitoring by non-depositors. Many countries in 
Europe, primarily Germany, Austria, Switzerland, Italy, and Spain, have similarly structured banking 
systems with institutions that operate with comparable business models. Moreover, these smaller 
European institutions, just as their U.S. counterparts, typically do not rely extensively on wholesale 
funding and are often privately held, suggesting subdued levels of market discipline in general. In 
short, we believe our conclusions regarding the effect of assigning priority claims to bank depositors 
in the resolution process provide useful insights for the policy debate in several other countries.  
We offer three key contributions to the literature. First, we illuminate the important debate about 
market discipline. In particular, we demonstrate, unlike most of the literature, that private sector agents 
not only monitor banks, but also causally influence bank conduct in terms of risk taking. The legal 
changes we focus on motivate non-depositors to collect information about banks’ risk profiles and act 
upon it. Early work by Gorton and Santomero (1990), and Avery et al. (1988) does not find strong 
associations between bondholders’ ability to price bank risk but subsequent studies conclude that 
investors and depositors are indeed able to do so (Flannery and Sorescu (1996); Flannery (2001); 
Goldberg and Hutchins (2002); Krishnan, Ritchken, and Thomson (2005); Martinez Peria and 
Schmukler (2001)). Further work in this area by Billett, Garfinkel, and O’Neal (1998) also challenges 
the capability of market participants to discipline banks. They show that market discipline deteriorates 
as banks become more risky because declines in bank health correlate with increasing use of insured 
deposits. In contrast to our work, these studies offer at best only evidence for the monitoring 
dimension of market discipline.  
The intuition for why regulatory frameworks also try to harness market forces to constrain bank risk 
taking is the expectation that monitoring by market participants results in a corresponding influence on 
conduct. In other words, what really matters is if increased scrutiny by private sector agents that are 
exposed to losses in case of bankruptcy limits risk taking. Except for Ashcraft (2008), who shows 
holders of subordinated debt can exert preventative influence on conduct if they can impose real 
constraints via covenants, we know of no other study that delivers evidence for the influencing 
dimension of market discipline. In contrast to Ashcraft (2008), our setting does not require covenants 
to be in place. For our analysis, it is sufficient to have an increase in monitoring which is attributable 
to changes in priority claims mandated by law. This approach is more efficient than relying on 
                                                          
4
  Note that state depositor preference laws do not distinguish between domestic and foreign deposits. Foreign deposits account for less 
than 7 percent of state-chartered banks’ balance sheets.  
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covenants as priority rules can be considered to be a substitute for private covenants that would be 
costly to write in the presence of transaction costs.  
Another factor that distinguishes our research from previous work on market discipline is the fact 
that we pay attention to the mechanism that makes debtholders engage in monitoring and influencing 
of bank conduct. While many of the earlier studies we discuss above hone in on easily observable 
relationships between bond prices and bank risk, we are the first to show that shocks induced by 
changes in legislation that affect priority claims on a failed bank’s assets have wide ranging 
implications for bank behavior. The magnitude of the effects we document in this work suggests 
considerable potential for depositor preference from the perspective of improving the institutional 
framework in banking which does not seem to have been sufficiently recognized in previous work.   
The second contribution of our work is to shed new light on the role of depositor preference 
legislation, an issue of timely relevance for the policy community in the aftermath of the financial 
crisis which has triggered a massive overhaul of the regulatory framework with intensive debates 
about bank resolution.  
Previous research has also focused on depositor preference in the U.S. In stark contrast to our work, 
Hirschhorn and Zervos (1990), Osterberg (1996), Osterberg and Thomson (1999, 2003) exclusively 
examine the introduction of national depositor preference in 1993 in the U.S., and largely limit 
themselves to analyses of the pricing effects of depositor preference, how depositor preference affects 
failure rates, and the losses incurred by the deposit insurer. The importance of our experimental setup 
becomes obvious when we compare our results with those of previous studies. Earlier work reports 
mixed evidence for the effect on funding costs as their empirical tests cannot disentangle the adoption 
of national depositor preference from other coinciding events. Moreover, Hirschhhorn and Zervos 
(1990) only examine the thrift industry. Unlike these papers, we present a natural experiment that 
permits isolating the effects from state-level depositor preference legislation that predates the 
introduction of national depositor preference. A further result that delineates our work from the earlier 
research is our finding that once national depositor preference law was enacted, state-chartered banks 
that were already subject to preferential treatment of depositors no longer display changes in funding 
costs and liability structure.  
Related to these early studies on depositor preference is work by Hardy (2013). He develops 
predictions arising from depositor preference for funding costs, profitability, and the probability and 
cost of bankruptcy. He argues that claimants to the residual assets of failed banks lobby to assert 
claims to the share of residual assets, where lobbying is increasing in the volume of residual assets. 
The lobbying process increases bankruptcy costs as it extends the resolution period. Moreover, if one 
claimant takes legal action, the Nash equilibrium is for other claimants and the receiver to also take 
legal action. Since depositors enjoy a preferred status under depositor preference laws, no resources 
need be deployed to establish this position. In turn, the volume of residual assets non-deposit creditors 
fight over is reduced and so are bankruptcy costs. The implication for the probability of bankruptcy is 
straightforward: If depositor preference lowers banks’ overall funding costs, ceteris paribus, the 
probability of bankruptcy will endogenously decrease. In contrast to his work which is exclusively 
theoretical, we take these issues to the data and test these predictions empirically.  
The third contribution is that we are the first to exploit a so far neglected natural experiment that 
causes a switch in monitoring intensity by different groups of debtholders to study market discipline. 
Our experiment represents a useful source of plausibly exogenous variation in the monitoring 
activities by junior claimholders on a bank’s assets. Such a switch in monitoring effort is also of 
relevance for other questions in banking, e.g., whether the additional monitoring by junior claimants 
produces new information that can be exploited for the allocation of supervisory resources and 
prudential regulation.  
Finally, our study also advances the literature on bank capital structure and funding choices. This 
debate is relevant because bank funding models, not only in Europe, have been criticized for their 
vulnerability in the academic literature and by policy makers in the aftermath of the crisis (Demirgüç-
Kunt and Huizinga (2010); Huang and Ratnovski (2011); Le Lesle (2012)).  Importantly, regulating 
bank capital and developing rules that focus specifically on banks’ liability composition have received 
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a massive overhaul in the past few years. A substantial body of literature exists on banks’ capital 
choices. Froot and Stein (1998) establish the association between risk management, capital budgeting, 
and capital structure in banks, and subsequent work by Cebenoyan and Strahan (2004) shows that 
credit risk management is a key determinant for banks’ capital structure. Peura and Keppo (2006) 
report that differences in returns volatility and in the level of capital market imperfections are also 
important determinants of cross-section of banks’ capital ratios. Berger et al. (2008) investigate how 
bank holding companies manage their capital structure, and Gropp and Heider (2010) echo results in 
the corporate finance literature by showing that bank-fixed effects explain most of the variation in 
bank capital ratios. The role of regulatory innovation is investigated by Flannery and Rangan (2008). 
They examine changes in bank capital structure and conclude that changes in regulation increased 
bank counterparties’ monitoring incentives and price risk more adequately. Recently, Admati et al. 
(2013) propose higher minimum capital ratios are the best possible way to improve soundness, and 
Flannery (2014) discusses how regulators can ensure that banks maintain adequate levels of loss-
absorbing capital, stressing that credible bail-in provisions lead junior debtholders to provide market 
signals when bank soundness deteriorates. Our paper differs from these two related strands of 
literature about capital structure and funding mix by paying particular attention to how different 
components of bank debt respond to an exogenously triggered switch in monitoring intensity by junior 
claimholders. 
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides an overview about the legislative history of 
depositor preference legislation that underpins our quasi-experiment and several exogeneity tests. 
Section 3 describes the data and discusses representativeness. Our identification strategy and the main 
results are presented in Section 4. Section 5 deals with identification concerns, shows further 
sensitivity tests, and discusses the external validity. Section 6 contains concluding remarks.  
2. Institutional background: The staggered nature of depositor preference legislation 
The regulatory framework in the U.S. prescribes detailed guidelines for the resolution of failed 
banks. The assets of a failed institution are transferred to a receivership, represented by the Federal 
Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) whose task it is to identify and satisfy creditors, and maximize 
the net present value of recoveries for the receivership claimants. We first provide a synopsis of the 
legislative history of the claim structure for a failed bank’s deposits. Subsequently, we present 
empirical support for the exogeneity of depositor preference laws with respect to bank behavior, and 
we also rule out that interest-groups lobby for adoption of depositor preference.  
2.1 History of depositor preference legislation 
The FDIC, in its role as a receiver, pays off claimants in line with the guidelines for receiverships of 
banks established by the Banking Act of 1935. The FDIC assigns priority claims to the receiver who 
obtains part of the proceedings as compensation for administrative expenses. Next in line are secured 
claimants who have collateralized claims.
5 
They are followed by depositors with account balances 
below the deposit insurance coverage limit, with uninsured depositors whose account balances exceed 
the deposit insurance coverage limit and non-depositors coming thereafter.
6
 The latter two groups have 
claims of equal priority. Last in the queue are holders of subordinated debt, and shareholders. 
Importantly, several states depart from the provisions laid out in the Banking Act of 1935, and 
change the priority structure of claims for state-chartered banks in their respective state banking laws. 
Starting in 1909, Nebraska established that depositors have a priority claim over the claims of general, 
i.e., non-deposit creditors. In the following years, 29 other states also adopted what has become known 
as “depositor preference laws”, thus elevating the claims of all depositors, both insured and uninsured 
ones. Of those 29 states, 15 states (Arizona, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, Hawaii, 
Kansas, Louisiana, Maine, Minnesota, Missouri, New Hampshire, North Dakota, Rhode Island, Texas) 
adopted depositor preference laws during our sample period 1983Q1 –  1993Q2. As we discuss below, 
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  Secured claims receive priority only for the value of the collateral securing the claim.  If the value of the collateral is less than the 
amount of the claim, the unsecured portion falls into the priority scheme according to the type of claim (Marino and Bennett (1999)). 
6  
Non-depositors include: trade creditors, beneficiaries of guarantees, foreign depositors, holders of bankers’ acceptances, unsecured 
lenders, landlords, suppliers of Fed funds, and counterparties to swaps and other contingent liabilities.  
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the differential treatment of claims on failed banks’ assets depending on the type of charter is 
abolished in 1993Q3 with the introduction of national depositor preference.  
Table 1, Panel A, highlights the staggered nature of the adoption of state depositor preference laws.  
[INSERT TABLE 1: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF DEPOSITOR PREFERENCE ADOPTION] 
How are these legal provisions embedded in state laws? To obtain the original text of the law, we 
contact the legislative council archives and the chartering authority in each one of these 15 states. 
Appendix A presents the codified law at that time for each one of these states that enter our empirical 
analysis.
7
 Typically, these provisions are found in a section entitled “Involuntary Liquidation 
Procedure”, “Payment of Claims”, or “Distribution of Assets”. While the wording and some details 
differ across states, the priority structure for the claims on failed banks’ assets with a state charter that 
emerges looks as follows: 
1. administrative expenses of the receiver; 
2. secured claims; 
3. deposits, both insured and uninsured; 
4. other general creditor claims; 
5. subordinated creditor claims; and 
6. shareholders. 
Why did not all states introduce such legislation? Table 1, Panel A, and Figure 1 do not suggest any 
geographic clustering of states which are prone to adopt depositor preference laws. To gain a deeper 
insight into the motivation behind the introduction of depositor preference, we also screen the 
legislative council’s digest, concurrencies of the state amendments, and the assembly laws themselves 
from the legislative council’s archives. We also run keyword searches in the Journal State 
Legislatures, Lexis/Nexis, Factiva, and American Banker using a one year time window with 6 months 
on either side around the day of the introduction of depositor preference laws.
8 
 
The key result from our investigation of the documents from the legislative councils is that adopting 
depositor preference did not get much attention from the policy community. If anything, these changes 
are considered necessary to rectify omissions in previous legislation. California is an illustrative 
example. The concurrency of the state amendment mentions that the current law did at that time not 
specify a priority for the payment of depositors and creditors and liquidation expenses and instead 
requires pro rata settlement. The new legal provisions address this lack of a priority order 
comprehensively. In addition, assigning priority to depositors’ claims is believed to facilitate the use 
of purchase and assumption transactions, and allows depositors to access their funds more quickly 
relative to liquidating a bank. In a limited number of other instances, the legislative council’s digest 
highlights amendments for the reorganization and dissolution of state banks, and emphasizes that 
changes are being made to the order of priority claims in a bank’s liquidation without providing a 
reason behind it.  
Our keyword search of the media sources, limited again to one year centered on the event day of the 
adoption of depositor preference, does not provide any indication that the media paid much attention 
to depositor preference. The exception are sources reporting that the then FDIC Chairman, William L. 
Seidman, gave testimony to the Senate Banking Committee in 1986 recommending to adopt federal 
depositor preference to reduce failure cost.
9
 However, it took until 1993Q3 before depositor preference 
was codified in federal law, applying to all banks, irrespective of their charter type.  
                                                          
7  We exclude Utah and Virginia. These two states enacted depositor preference laws in 1983 but the absence of some variables and the 
annual sampling frequency in Call Report data prior to 1983 renders the inclusion of these two states in our empirical analyses 
infeasible.  
8  We use the following keywords: “deposit obligation”, “depositor obligation”, “claims of depositors”, “claim structure”, “bank 
liquidation”, “depositor preference”, “priority of claims”, “priority claim”, “liquidation priority”, “liquidation regime”, “claims be paid 
before those of general creditors”, “pari passu with general creditors”, “deposit rank”, “depositor rank”. 
9  See American Banker, 14th March 1986 “FDIC offers plan to protect uninsured depositors”. Similar news reports occur in the same week 
in the Chicago Sun Times, the New York Times, and on Dow Jones Newswire.  
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Appendix A provides further details about the political and economic environment at the time the 
individual states adopted depositor preference. We conduct an additional keyword search in American 
Banker, Lexis/Nexis and Factiva to identify any other events that may have coincided temporarily 
with the changes in priority claims to understand whether particular episodes of banking strain or 
political economy considerations play a role for the introduction of depositor preference laws.
10
  
Depositor preference laws are somewhat more often found in states with Democratic Party 
governors, and when democrats hold control of both the upper and the lower house of the legislature. 
However, our analysis of other key events yields no consistent pattern. In several states, the news 
search produces no relevant information that would have any bearing on the motives to introduce 
depositor preference. Occasionally, the media pays attention to bank mergers (Arizona, California) or 
reports that banks are performing well in Florida, Hawaii, and Minnesota. On the other hand, there is 
also evidence that banks in the South West (Texas, California) and in the North East (Main, New 
Hampshire, Connecticut, Rhode Island) experience considerable strain arising from collapsing real 
estate and energy prices.  
In 1993, the legislative history takes another turn on 10 August when the Clinton administration 
amends the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Act regarding the priority of claims on assets of a 
failed bank and introduces national depositor preference as part of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation 
Act.  
As a result, claims on failed state-chartered banks in states that previously did not have depositor 
preference and claims on nationally-chartered banks now also had priority above those of general 
creditors. National depositor preference has the same effects as had state laws for state-chartered banks 
except that national depositor preference distinguishes between domestic and foreign deposits. In a 
similar vein as our review of the individual state’s adoption of depositor preference suggests, national 
depositor preference was also not driven by concerns about bank safety and soundness. Instead, 
national depositor preference was principally introduced to save money in the federal budget rather 
than to facilitate the resolution of ailing banks via purchase and assumption transactions or increasing 
market discipline by providing stronger incentives for non-depositors to monitor banks. These reasons 
are put forward by the FDIC which has been lobbying since the mid-1980s for such guidelines. In fact, 
the budgetary purpose of the law received attention in the media while the bill was moving through 
Congress, in contrast to any mentioning of safety and soundness considerations. Legal scholars such as 
Curtis (1992, p. 244) are more explicit in their assessment of the motivation behind this law stating,  
“[…] the depositor preference regime was not enacted for reasons having to do with 
safe and sound bank regulation or with orderly liquidation, but rather, as indicated by 
its inclusion in the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, entirely for budgetary 
reasons - it was a means for the federal government to spend less money.”  
2.2 Exogeneity of depositor preference legislation and bank conduct 
Our survey of the legislative history and motivation behind the introduction of state depositor 
preference laws does not suggest that the health of the state banking systems was a key force behind 
the adoption of this legislation. However, to claim causality in our subsequent tests, we need to 
establish the exogeneity of these laws with respect to the outcomes our research focuses on. 
To this end, we estimate linear probability models in which state depositor preference laws are a 
function of private interest-group, public interests, and political-institutional factors to understand how 
changes in these variables over time and across states affect the likelihood of depositor preference. 
Our strategy entails estimating the following reduced form 
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𝐷𝑃𝐿𝑠𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑠𝑡 + 𝛾𝑃𝑢𝑏𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑠𝑡 + 𝛿𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑡 + 𝛾𝑠 + 𝛾𝑡 + 𝜀𝑠𝑡 ,    (1) 
where 𝐷𝑃𝐿𝑠𝑡 is a dummy variable equal to 1 if state 𝑠 has enacted depositor preference law in quarter 
𝑡, 0 otherwise; 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑠𝑡 is a vector of private-interest variables such as the share of bank assets held 
by state-chartered banks within the state-quarter; 𝑃𝑢𝑏𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑠𝑡 contains a proxy for the extent to which a 
state is affected by the S&L crisis (measured as the ratio of assets in failed thrifts to total bank assets), 
total assets in failed banks (ln), and the mean profitability of banks in the state; 𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑡 contains a 
dummy variable equal to 1 if a democrat is state governor, 0 otherwise, to capture differences in 
regulation propensity between political parties (Krozner and Strahan (1999)). State and quarter-fixed 
effects are denoted by 𝛾𝑠 and 𝛾𝑡, respectively, and 𝜀𝑠𝑡 is the error term. The sample window 
corresponds to that used in our subsequent main empirical analyses, 1983Q1 to 1993Q2, for the 15 
states that adopt depositor preference law. We cluster standard errors at the state level. 
The results of this exercise, shown in Panel B of Table 1, substantiate our previous argument. 
Specifically, we find no evidence that private, public, or political factors systematically predict 
whether a depositor preference law is in force. Irrespective of whether we include each interest vector 
sequentially (Columns 1 to 3) or simultaneously (Column 4) in the equation, none of the explanatory 
variables assume significance at conventional levels. In sum, the enactment of depositor preference 
laws for state-chartered banks appears to be as good as random. 
We briefly also explore as to whether the banks in the treatment and control group differ in terms of 
the key observables prior to the introduction of depositor preference legislation. Panel C in Table 1 
illustrates that the t-statistics for differences in means for total interest expenses, interest on deposits, 
interest on non-deposits, bank size (in terms of total asset), and the capital ratio remain insignificant at 
conventional levels. This snapshot suggests our control group is observationally very similar to the 
treatment group.  
Our final diagnostic test uses Cox proportional hazard models to examine whether movements in 
our variables of interest precipitate enactment of depositor preference laws. If so, the assumption of 
treatment exogeneity would cease to hold. However, the results in Table 2 confirm that the dependent 
variables we use in the regression analysis do not explain implementation of the state laws, adding 
further credence to the argument that these are exogenous shocks.  
[INSERT TABLE 2: EXOGENEITY TESTS: COX PROPORTIONAL HAZARD MODELS] 
3. Data and methodology 
In this section, we first describe our data. Next, we then discuss our econometric setup, paying 
particular attention to the identifying assumptions of difference-in-difference estimation.  
3.1 Data description and representativeness 
We obtain quarterly data for commercial and savings banks in the U.S. from their Quarterly Report 
on Condition and Income (Call Report), available from the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago.  
Our sample window covers the period 1983Q1 to 1993Q2. This time span is chosen because banks 
were not obliged to submit Call Reports on a quarterly basis before 1983 and because the Omnibus 
Budget Reconciliation Act was signed into law in 1993Q3, resulting in all banks being subject to 
depositor preference laws. This results in a sample containing 528,522 observations for 15,392 banks 
from all 50 states. However, most of our inferences are based on a smaller sample consisting of banks 
headquartered in the 15 states that enacted depositor preference law between 1983Q1 and 1993Q2. 
This results in a cleaner sample of 199,698 observations for 5,506 banks. 
We exclude banks operating in New York state due to their size and specific regulatory environment 
(Osterberg (1996)). To ensure that we have a sufficiently large number of observations for each 
individual bank, we only include institutions that operate in at least four quarters prior to and 
following the introduction of state depositor preference laws.
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11  The results are however unchanged when we include New York banks in the sample. Likewise, when we include banks that do not 
operate at least four quarters before and after the law change in the sample the results are almost identical. 
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Panel A of Table 3 presents summary statistics. The average bank in our sample has 108,969 TUSD 
total assets, a Z-score of 72.793, and a return on assets of 0.3%. 
To establish representativeness, we also compare the banks in our 15-state sample with the average 
bank in the U.S. using the entire population of banks in 1993. The mean asset size for all banks in the 
U.S. is 130,943.5 TUSD, with a Z-score 120.6, and return on assets of 0.3%. Panel B of Table 3 
presents Wilcoxon rank tests for the equality of means between the banks in the sample and the 
population of all banks in the U.S. for selected variables measuring asset size, profitability, and 
soundness. Except for a weakly significant difference at the ten percent level for bank soundness, these 
tests suggest that there are no significant differences in terms of asset size and profitability.   
[INSERT TABLE 3: SUMMARY STATISTICS AND REPRESENTATIVENESS] 
3.2 Identification strategy 
We turn to difference-in-difference estimations that exploit plausibly exogenous variation in 
depositor preference law across U.S. states and across time. This setup enables us to retrieve the 
average treatment effect of depositor preference laws by comparing the evolution of funding costs, 
liability structure, soundness, and profitability between the treatment group (i.e., the state-chartered 
banks) and the control group (the nationally-chartered banks) through time.  
Except for the first set of tests in Section 4.1 below which use banks from all U.S. states to include 
the largest possible control group of banks with similar pre-treatment trends during the 1983Q1-
1993Q2 period, our estimations are constrained to the 15 states that adopted depositor preference 
legislation. This setup facilitates identification. These banks operate within the same environment, 
resulting in a cleaner economic laboratory because all confounding effects that simultaneously affect 
both groups can be eliminated. In other words, our estimator considers the time difference of the group 
differences within the same federal state, i.e., it accounts for omitted variables that affect treatment and 
untreated banks equally. For the main regressions we focus on the period 1983Q1 to 1993Q2, and 
estimate 
𝑦𝑖𝑠𝑡 =  𝛼 + 𝛽𝐷𝑃𝐿𝑠𝑡 ∗ 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖 +  𝛿𝑋𝑖𝑠𝑡 + 𝛾𝑖 + 𝛾𝑠𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑠𝑡    (2) 
where 𝑦𝑖𝑠𝑡 is a dependent variable for bank i in state s at time t, capturing either the cost of funds or 
liability structure, bank soundness, or profitability; 𝐷𝑃𝐿𝑠𝑡 is a dummy variable equal to 1 for all banks 
in states and years following introduction of depositor preference law or zero otherwise; 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖 is a 
dummy variable equal to 1 for all state-chartered banks, 0 for nationally-chartered institutions. 𝑋𝑖𝑠𝑡 is a 
vector of bank-time varying control variables defined in Section 3.3 below; 𝛾𝑖 and 𝛾𝑠𝑡 are bank and 
state-quarter effects, respectively. This battery of dummy variables allow us to rule out all 
unobservable time-invariant bank-specific factors, and state-time-varying forces at the state and 
national levels, that might drive changes in the dependent variables and coincide with the introduction 
of depositor preference laws. Moreover, the inclusion of state-quarter fixed effects provides very clean 
identification of the average treatment effect as we exploit cross-charter variation within the state-
quarter dimension of the data set. The term 𝜀𝑖𝑠𝑡 is the error term. Our coefficient of interest is β. Its 
magnitude provides information about the effect of depositor preference laws for state-chartered 
banks. As is customary when using difference-in-difference regressions, we cluster heteroskedasticity-
adjusted standard errors on the bank level to account for serial correlation within each panel (Bertrand, 
Mullainathan, and Duflo (2004)). Subsequent robustness tests show our findings are not affected by 
alternative ways of clustering. 
3.3 Variable definitions 
To establish whether assigning priority to depositors’ claims in a bank insolvency changes 
monitoring activities and also triggers changes in bank conduct in terms of risk taking, our empirical 
tests focus on three key outcomes.  
First, we examine the monitoring dimension of market discipline. Several previous papers have 
attempted to provide evidence of market discipline by examining interest rates paid by commercial 
banks (Goldberg and Hudgins (2002)). If depositor preference lowers the risk of all depositors they 
should demand a lower interest rate. In contrast, since non-deposit claimants face a higher risk in case 
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of failure, they are likely to demand compensation for bearing more risk and will therefore demand a 
risk premium. Thus, depositor preference legislation should trigger a pricing response, depending on 
the seniority of the debt claim.  
Our first set of tests therefore examines different components of banks’ funding costs. Specifically, 
we use a variable measuring average interest expenses on all liabilities (Total interest expenses), 
calculated as the ratio of total expenses on liabilities to total liabilities. We also focus on the costs of 
deposits, using the ratio of interest paid on deposits to total deposits held by banks (Interest on 
deposits).
12
 The costs of non-deposit funds (Interest on non-deposits) are captured by the average 
interest expenses on non-deposits divided by total liabilities.  This variable encompasses both Federal 
Funds purchased, and other non-deposit funds. The former are computed as expenses on Federal 
Funds purchased, and the latter are calculated as expenses on other non-deposits. 
Second, it is plausible to anticipate not only price but also quantity effects. We therefore explore 
how state-chartered banks’ market share of insured deposits, uninsured deposits, and non-deposits (all 
scaled by the total of this variable held by both state- and nationally-chartered banks in that state- 
quarter) respond to the laws. 
The third set of analyses is concerned with the influencing dimension of market discipline. 
Assuming non-depositors are efficient monitors, we should be able to observe changes in bank 
conduct in terms of banks’ propensity to take risk, reflected in lower Z-scores, lower non-performing 
loans, and reduced leverage. The Z-score is an accounting-based measure of banks’ distance to default, 
calculated as the sum of return on assets and the equity-to-asset ratio divided by the standard deviation 
of the return on assets, calculated over a four-quarter rolling time window. This time window allows 
for sufficient variation in the denominator of the Z-Score, and avoids that Z-Scores are driven 
exclusively by variation in the levels of capital and profitability. The skewed distribution of the Z-
score necessitates a log transformation, and all tests are based on Z-score (ln). A higher Z-Score (ln) 
implies a lower probability of insolvency. As part of the analysis of banks’ risk taking, we also 
decompose the Z-score into its three components and subsequently also examine alternative measures 
of profitability by analyzing return on assets, and the ratio of total interest income to total loans 
(TIINC) which is measured in logarithms, and return on equity (ROE).  
The vector of time-varying control variables,  𝑋𝑖𝑠𝑡, includes total assets (ln) to measure bank size, 
and we also use the ratio of equity capital to total assets as a measure for the capitalization of the bank. 
To avoid that the S&L crisis confounds our inferences, we also add a proxy for the intensity of the 
S&L crisis, measured by the ratio of failed thrift assets to total bank assets in the state, in the 
regressions that exclude state-quarter fixed effects. Depending on the regression specification, the 
vector of control variables may also contain two dummies that take on the value of one if a state has 
deregulated interstate or intrastate branching, respectively.  
3.4 Do nationally-chartered banks constitute a valid counterfactual? Parallel trends 
We have already documented that treatment status is plausibly exogenous with respect to the 
outcomes we study. However, the validity of difference-in-difference estimation also requires that 
nationally-chartered banks constitute a valid counterfactual. That is, in the absence of treatment the 
behavior of the state-chartered banks in the treatment group would have evolved in similar fashion to 
the behavior of the nationally-chartered banks in the control group. In other words, the treatment and 
control groups should have parallel trends in the period prior to treatment. This section provides 
empirical support for the existence of such parallel trends. 
Figure 1 graphically examines the extent to which cost of funds, liability structure, soundness, and 
profitability evolve similarly over the three quarters prior to the introduction of depositor preference 
laws.
13
 State-chartered banks are the treatment group and are represented by a blue triangle, and 
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nationally-chartered banks (the control group) are denoted by a red square. The close fit between the 
movements in the two groups suggests that nationally-chartered banks appear to represent a good 
counterfactual.  
[INSERT FIGURE 2: PARALLEL TRENDS] 
In addition to illustrating the evolution of bank behavior graphically, we conduct t-tests to verify 
the assumption of parallel trends. Following Lemmon and Roberts (2010), we examine whether there 
are significant differences in the quarterly growth rate of each variable between the treatment and 
control group during each pre-treatment quarter. Note that this assumption does not require identical 
levels between treatment and control groups, they are differenced out (Lemmon and Roberts (2010)). 
The diagnostics in Table 4 support the assumption of parallel trends: the null of equality of means 
cannot be rejected in any cell in the table. 
 [INSERT TABLE 4: PARALLEL TRENDS TESTS] 
4. Empirical results 
We first discuss the pricing effects of depositor preference on banks’ funding costs, and then present 
the findings for the quantity effects and focus on market share. Next, we provide a long term 
perspective, and our final set of results considers bank soundness and profitability. 
Importantly, all these regressions include bank-fixed effects to eradicate time-invariant effects such 
as individual banks’ risk taking culture, time-varying bank-level control variables, and a set of state-
quarter-fixed effects that control for unobservable time-varying common shocks such as contractions 
in the local economy that may affect the demand for banking services.  
4.1 Pricing effects: Cost of funds  
The difference-in-difference regressions in Table 5 present in Panel A the results using the sample 
for all 50 states for the pricing effects from depositor preference. We show results with and without 
control variables for bank size, capitalization,  a proxy for the intensity of the S&L crisis, and the two 
dummy variables for inter- and intrastate deregulation. 
Irrespective of the inclusion of control variables in Panel A, our tests highlight that assigning priority 
to bank deposits lowers overall funding costs. Importantly, we find compelling evidence for increases 
in market discipline. 
The second set of regressions in Table 5 Panel B restricts the sample to the 15 states that adopt 
depositor preference laws during the sample window. In other words, our econometric setup gets 
tighter in terms of identification since the tests in Panel B are based on a cleaner counterfactual. This is 
because our control group is constrained to nationally-chartered banks headquartered in the same 
macroeconomic environment.  
Our key coefficient of interest on the interaction term between the charter dummy and the dummy 
variable for depositor preference enters significantly with intuitive signs across all specifications. 
Since Panel B is our preferred specification as discussed above, all subsequent analyses and the 
corresponding discussion of results are based on this smaller sample. All results are however robust to 
using the 50 state sample.  
We obtain clear evidence that depositor preference legislation affects bank’s funding costs. State-
chartered banks’ total funding costs decline, reflected in the ratio of total interest expenses to total 
liabilities. Using the more conservative estimates from Panel B, our tests indicate that interest 
expenses to total liabilities fall by 0.0192 following enactment of depositor preference: equivalent to a 
1.5% decrease in average interest expenses holding total liabilities constant.
14
 
Which liability components drive this effect? Column 2 in Panel B confirms the prediction by Hardy 
(2013) that depositor preference laws reduce interest payments to (insured) depositors (t-statistic -
4.56). However, Panel B Column 3 highlights that other creditors require compensation in return for 
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  Note that we obtain virtually identical results if we include a charter time trend to capture the time trend that affects all state-chartered 
banks equally across the US. The results are presented in Appendix B, Table B.1.  
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having their claims subordinated to the FDIC with higher interest payments (t-statistic 6.31). The 
coefficient indicates that the increase in interest payments to non-depositors is approximately seven 
times larger than the coefficient for the decrease in interest payments to depositors.   
Among the control variables, we find that bank size correlates positively with all types of funds, 
whereas better capitalized banks pay lower interest, except for non-deposits, where we obtain a 
positive and significant effect.  
[INSERT TABLE 5: PRICING EFFECTS OF DEPOSITOR PREFERENCE] 
4.2. Quantity effects: market share analysis 
Table 6, Panel A, focuses on the corresponding quantity effects. Column 1 indicates that changes to 
the debt priority structure have no effect on state-chartered banks’ market share of insured deposits. 
This makes sense given that insured depositors position in the pay-out ladder is unaffected by 
depositor preference laws. However, in Column 2 we find a statistically significant 13 percent increase 
in state-chartered banks’ market share of uninsured deposits. This increase is sizeable in terms of its 
economic magnitude and suggests that risk-averse uninsured depositors increase supply to state-
chartered banks. A rightward shift of the uninsured deposits supply curve is also consistent with the 
previous result that conferring seniority on this creditor class leads them to demand a lower risk 
premium.  
 [INSERT TABLE 6: QUANTITY EFFECTS AND LONG-RUN EFFECTS] 
In Column 3 we do not find a statistically significant average treatment effect for the market share of 
non-deposits. Non-depositors do not divest their holdings in state-chartered banks post treatment. 
However, once their claims are subordinated they face greater exposure to losses in the event of 
bankruptcy. As a result non-depositors demand a higher ex ante interest rate in compensation. 
4.3. Do the effects persist in the long run? 
Our results so far indicate both statistically and economically large effects of the introduction of 
depositor preference. We now focus specifically on the question of whether the impact of depositor 
preference is only observable in the short run, or, alternatively, if the effects are permanent and can be 
observed over longer periods of time.  
We augment the regression specification from our main tests with nine dummy variables 
corresponding to the quarter in which the legislation was enacted and a dummy variable for quarter 𝑖 
where 𝑖 =∈ (0, … ,9) denotes the quarter after enactment. 𝑖 = 0 is the quarter of enactment. The 
additional dummy variables are interacted with the charter dummy. Panel B of Table 6 shows that the 
effects of depositor preference persist in the long run. There is an immediate and permanent decline in 
total interest expenses and interest payments on deposits, and the effects are also similar in terms of 
the economic magnitude. The previously documented increase in interest on non-deposits is also of 
permanent nature but it takes one quarter to materialize. Our findings are intuitive. The funding cost 
advantage arising from depositor preference is persistent, enshrined in law, and therefore lowers the 
probability of bankruptcy in all future periods. 
4.4 Effects on bank soundness and profitability 
Beyond the immediate pricing and quantity effects that arise from increased monitoring, it is critical 
to document whether the increase in market discipline also influences bank risk taking, a key concern 
among bank regulatory agencies. The importance of this test is reflected in the fact that the lobbying 
by the FDIC for the introduction of national depositor preference prior to 1993Q3 paid close attention 
to the argument that depositor preference will incentivize banks to operate safe and sound.  
To test this prediction of whether an increase in monitoring explains the variation in banks’ risk 
taking, we run regressions in Table 7, Panel A. Here, we use the Z-score (ln) as a dependent variable 
to test these ideas.
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 We also use the ratio of non-performing loans and the leverage ratio as dependent 
                                                          
15  Note that of the 5,506 banks in the sample, only a small proportion of banks is publicly listed. For this reason, we only rely on 
accounting based measures of bank soundness.  
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variables in Panel A. Subsequently, we also examine the effect of depositor preference laws on the 
three components of the Z-score (ln) to understand the driving forces behind the effects we uncover. 
State-chartered banks’ Z-scores (ln) increase significantly following the announcement of depositor 
preference laws, supporting the idea that harnessing market discipline improves bank health. The 
magnitude of this effect is economically large at 22%. The findings for non-performing loans and 
leverage reinforce the soundness-enhancing effects of depositor preference laws.  
Our analysis of the components of the Z-score (ln) shows that this finding is driven by higher profits 
(t-statistic 3.20) although there is no change in the volatility of profits. This increase in profitability, 
reiterated in Panel B when we examine return on equity, and the ratio of total interest income to total 
loans (ln) as alternative measures of profitability, ties in with the result for lower levels of non-
performing loans and points towards increased asset quality. Consistent with improved behavior, we 
also find reductions in the non-performing loans ratio and leverage, although the effects are only 
significant at the 10 percent level.    
[INSERT TABLE 7: BANK HEALTH AND PROFITABILITY] 
5.  Identification concerns, sensitivity tests, and external validity 
We have already documented that state-chartered and nationally-chartered banks are observationally 
similar prior to treatment in terms of the levels of key characteristics.  
Importantly, however, our identification strategy assumes that, in the absence of treatment, state-
chartered banks evolve similarly over time as national banks. In Section 3 above, we have already 
shown that treatment and control groups display such parallel trends. Moreover, we also offer support 
for the assumption that treatment is plausibly exogenous with respect to the outcomes we study.  
5.1 Potential confounds and omitted variables 
We now deal with the remaining concern: Omitted variables and confounding events. If the 
enactment of depositor preference legislation coincides temporarily with other factors that are not 
accounted for or unobservable to the econometrician and only affect state banks but not nationally-
chartered banks then we would misattribute the effects we document to the passing of state depositor 
preference laws when in fact other factors are responsible for the observed changes in bank conduct. 
Dummy variables can only bulletproof observational data to omitted variable problems to a certain 
extent. Importantly, our tests are based on within state-quarter comparisons of state and nationally-
chartered banks for 15 states which adopt depositor preference legislation in a staggered manner. All 
regressions include time-varying controls, bank-fixed effects which net out omitted variables that are 
time-invariant on the bank level, and state-quarter-fixed effects to net out unobserved heterogeneity on 
the state-quarter level. This setup makes it unlikely that regional macroeconomic conditions, demand 
conditions, or changes in regulation which affect all banks equally drive the behavior of our key 
coefficient. Any omitted variable that could confound our inferences has to differentially affect state 
and nationally-chartered banks within the same state. Moreover, such an omitted variable would have 
to coincide with enactment of depositor preference in 15 instances. Finding such a coinciding factor is 
less likely in our context than in a study with just one treatment.   
Our first candidate for such a change in bank characteristics over time which may systematically 
correlate with the outcomes of interest and coincide with the adoption of depositor preference is bank 
size. The analyses above show that funding costs correlate with size in a systematic manner. We 
therefore include in Table 8, Panel A, an interaction between size in terms of total assets and a dummy 
for state-chartered banks (zero otherwise) because the behavior of state and nationally-chartered banks 
could differentially be affected by size. Similarly, we add to this specification an interaction between 
size in terms of total assets and our dummy for depositor preference (zero otherwise).  
While the former interaction term remains insignificant, the latter interaction enters consistently 
negatively and significantly. However, our key coefficient on the interaction term between the charter 
dummy and the depositor preference law dummy remains very similar.   
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Next, we deal with the challenge that banks may have been concerned about the potential 
implications for their funding costs and therefore switch charters to circumvent the increase in 
monitoring from non-deposit claimants associated with depositor preference. While our review of the 
legislative history about the introduction of depositor preference does not suggest an intensive debate 
in the run up to the enactment of these provisions in state laws, we cannot rule out that banks are 
concerned about effects on their funding costs. Rosen (2005) documents that approximately 10% of 
banks switch their charter between 1977 and 2003, and that switching banks tend to be riskier. During 
our sample period 3.8% of banks change charter
16  
To rule out that concerns about funding costs drive changes in bank conduct, we present in Panel B 
of Table 8 linear probability regressions that models charter switches as a function of introducing 
depositor preference laws, bank-fixed effects, quarter-fixed effects, and the time-varying control 
variables we use in the main regressions. The key coefficient in these regressions, the dummy for the 
introduction of depositor preference, remains statistically indistinguishable from zero. Charter 
switches are not related to priority for depositors in the resolution process.
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In a second step, we remove banks that change their charter from the sample. The results, shown in 
Panel C of Table 8, fully reinforce our previous findings.  
[INSERT TABLE 8: INTERACTIONS WITH BANK SIZE AND CHARTER SWITCHES] 
Next, we review a series of events and regulatory changes that occur throughout our sample period, 
and discuss whether or not they qualify as confounding events. For each one of these events, we 
additionally present tests to rule out empirically that they have any bearing on our inferences.  
The 1980s and 1990s are characterized by a series of banking problems caused by maturity 
mismatches, fraud, and declining real estate and energy prices. 
Collapsing real estate prices after a wave of burgeoning growth triggered banking problems in New 
Hampshire, Connecticut, Massachusetts, and Rhode Island. In New England, 16 banks failed in 1990, 
52 in 1991, and 43 in 1992. These failures account for a large proportion of failed bank assets at the 
time, resulted in losses to the FDIC, and culminated in the failure of three subsidiaries of the Bank of 
New England Corporation, the most significant bank failure in that period. This New England banking 
crisis, as it became known, coincides with the signing into law of depositor preference laws in 1991 in 
Connecticut, Maine, New Hampshire, and Rhode Island.  
Moreover, Texas also experienced substantial banking problems. The banking industry in Texas 
which adopted depositor preference in 1985 with its large exposure to the energy industry was hit by a 
massive decline in oil prices in 1986. In addition, a tax law which reduced the incentive to hold real 
estate aggravated the economic malaise. In some areas, real estate prices for commercial property 
dropped by 30% between 1985 and 1987 (Gan (2004)).   
The last prominent confounding crisis event is the savings and loan (S&L) crisis with over 1,000 
failures of the 3,234 S&L associations across the U.S. between 1986 and 1995. This crisis was largely 
driven by a large-scale tax reform in 1986 which brought the previous real estate boom to a halt, 
deregulation of the savings and loans associations which allowed them to enter new business lines, a 
period of low inflation, and forbearance by regulatory agencies.   
While these three crises coincide with the adoption of depositor preference, it is difficult to see how 
they differentially affect state- and nationally-chartered banks. Nevertheless, we provide empirical 
support that these three crises do not confound our inferences.  
Table 9 presents regressions. The first set of tests in Panel A removes observations for Connecticut, 
Maine, New Hampshire, and Rhode Island between 1991 and 1993 to focus on the New England 
crisis, and the second test in Panel B removes all observations for Texan banks from 1986 onwards. In 
                                                          
16  During the sample period, 118 banks switch from state to national charters (77 after depositor preference), and 92 banks change charter 
from national to state charters (77 after depositor preference).   
17   In unreported regressions, we also estimate difference-in-differences regressions using linear probability and probit models that include 
the interaction of the dummy variables for state-chartered banks with the dummy for depositor preference. This interaction term also 
remains insignificant. The results are available upon request.  
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Panel C, we include additional interaction terms between the dummy for state-chartered banks and a 
proxy for the intensity of the S&L crisis (measured as the ratio of failed thrift assets to total bank 
assets in that state), and a triple interaction term between the dummy for state-chartered banks, the 
dummy for depositor preference, and the proxy for the S&L crisis. This approach departs from our 
method of investigating the role of the crises in Texas and New England because the depth and 
severity of the crisis differed across states and our method ensures the inferences are not confounded 
by coincidental S&L shocks within the state-quarter. These tests confirm our expectation that these 
episodes of banking turmoil do not have an effect on our inferences.  
[INSERT TABLE 9: CONFOUNDING EVENTS - BANKING CRISES] 
In response to these banking problems, legislators passed the Financial Institutions Reform, 
Recovery, and Enforcement Act (FIRREA) in 1989, and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation 
Improvement Act (FDICIA) in 1991.  
The FIRREA provided the authorities with the resources to close insolvent S&L institutions and pay 
off depositors. This law also amended the process for establishing receivership claims by providing 
guidelines as to how the receiver has to give notice of the receivership and when and how creditors 
can file claims with the intention to harmonize the liquidation process, irrespective of whether claims 
are filed against state banks, nationally-chartered banks, or S&L associations. However, it did not 
amend the order of priority in which creditors of a failed institution were paid off.  
If FIRREA plays any role for our inferences, removing observations from 1989Q4 to 1993Q2 during 
which FIRREA was in place should affect the key coefficients. Table 10, Panel A, shows this is not 
the case.  
The FDICIA contained further efforts to increase banking system health. This legislation increased 
the power of regulators and bolstered the resources of the FDIC. Inter alia, it introduced the least cost 
resolution provision and guidelines for prompt corrective action. While FDICIA does not prescribe 
changes to the claims structure in bank liquidations, the mandate to resolve banks at the least cost 
suggests a direct effect on the key coefficients of interest. Purchase and assumption transactions which 
tend to be associated with lower resolution costs are easier in states with depositor preference because 
depositor preference avoids the lobbying for claims as discussed by Hardy (2013). Empirically, this 
suggests that FDICIA should have resulted in treatment effects that are greater in absolute magnitude 
via the effect on nationally-chartered banks that did not have depositor preference. In other words, a 
test of the effects of depositor preference prior to the enactment of FDICIA should result in the same 
direction of the effects, yet at smaller magnitudes.  
To examine this conjecture, we omit observations from 1991Q4 to 1993Q2. The results, shown in 
Panel B of Table 10, confirm our hypothesis and reinforce our findings.  
 Another confounding effect is the wave of deregulation which concerns the lifting of restrictions on 
the geographical scope of bank activities. From the 1970s onwards, 38 states removed restrictions on 
intrastate branching and allowed bank holding companies (BHCs) to convert subsidiaries into 
branches. States also permitted de novo branching statewide. Similar to the introduction of state 
depositor preference laws, the branching deregulation comes about in a staggered manner. 
Simultaneously, several states also started to deregulate interstate restrictions since the 1970s in a 
staggered manner, culminating in the Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking Act of 1994 which allowed 
banks and BHCs to acquire banks and BHCs in other states. The deregulation of inter- and intrastate 
restrictions markedly changed the competitive landscape in the banking industry, primarily by 
facilitating cross-border mergers. However, these legislative changes do not affect state and 
nationally-chartered banks differentially, and they also do not affect the priority structure of claims.  
Empirical tests help rule out that the two types of deregulation drive our inferences. In Panel C of 
Table 10, we first interact a dummy variable that takes on the value of the dummy for bank charter 
types with a dummy variable for interstate deregulation which takes on the value of one if a state 
allowed interstate branching (or zero otherwise), and we then also interact this interaction term with 
the dummy variable for depositor preference laws. Next, we test for the effect of intrastate 
deregulation by following the same approach using a dummy variable that takes on the value of one if 
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a state also allowed intrastate branching (zero otherwise). The interaction terms remain insignificant, 
and our main results are unaffected, although the magnitude of the coefficients declines.   
[INSERT TABLE 10: CONFOUNDING EVENTS – REGULATION AND DEREGULATION] 
5.2 Other sensitivity tests 
We first revisit the validity of the parallel trends assumption and present placebo regressions. The 
intuition is that the changes in conduct we documented can only be observed when depositor 
preference affects state-chartered banks but they can neither be observed at other points in time, nor 
can they be observed in other types of banks which are not subject to treatment. Our first set of 
placebo tests in Panel A of Table 11 randomly assigns placebo treatments to nationally-chartered 
banks that operate in states where depositor preference was enacted to ensure that the economic 
environment is comparable. The second set of placebo tests in Panel B focuses on anticipation effects 
and assigns treatment randomly to state-chartered banks prior to the actual treatment to rule out that 
banks adjust their behavior in the run up to depositor preference. The placebo tests remain 
insignificant, showing that our results are not confounded by the reaction within the control group or 
by anticipation effects.   
A key condition for causal inferences is the random assignment of depositor preference laws. Whited 
and Roberts (2012) argue that the magnitudes of the coefficients in difference-in-difference estimation 
should remain unaffected irrespective of the inclusion of control variables if treatment can be assumed 
to be as good as random. Otherwise, random assignment for the treatment variable should be 
questioned. We replicate our main tests in Panel C of Table 11 without the time-varying bank-specific 
control variables, and find the magnitudes of the key coefficients to remain unchanged.  
Another set of sensitivity checks deals with serial correlation in the error terms. This is important 
because Bertrand et al. (2004) demonstrate that difference-in-differences estimators yield spuriously 
low standard errors leading to over-rejection of the null hypothesis when the dependent variable is 
serially correlated through time and there are more than two time periods. So far, we clustered 
heteroskedasticity-adjusted standard errors on the bank level to account for the structure of the serial 
correlation within each bank in our tests. As an alternative way Panel D collapses the observations 
before and the observations following enactment of depositor preference into one period at the mean 
value. This test does not affect our inferences.  
Finally, we jointly consider the correlation in the residuals within panels, i.e., across banks, and over 
time by replicating in Panel E of Table 11 the main regression with double-clustering of the standard 
errors at the bank and year level as suggested by Thompson (2011). Our results remain unchanged.
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[INSERT TABLE 11: FURTHER SENSITIVITY CHECKS] 
5.3 Falsification test and external validity 
Prior to closing the loop by discussing the external validity of our tests, we present a falsification 
exercise. 
To this end, we run Monte Carlo simulations with 1,000 replications to check whether state- 
chartered banks were affected by federal depositor legislation in 1993. For this test, we constrain the 
sample to state-chartered banks from the 15 states in our main analyses because a suitable control 
group does not exist. Next, we randomly assign banks to a placebo treatment that is equal to 1 in 
1993Q3 and all subsequent quarters or zero otherwise. We then estimate 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑝𝑙𝑎𝑐𝑒𝑏𝑜𝑖𝑡 + 𝑋𝑖𝑡
′ 𝛾 + 𝜑𝑖 + 𝜑𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡  .      (3) 
Conditional on quarter-fixed effects, this specification estimates how much higher/lower the 
dependent variable was within the same bank following the introduction of national depositor 
preference. Because we know this should have had no effect on state-chartered banks, we know that 
the null of zero effect is true. We should therefore only reject the null by making Type 1 errors. The 
                                                          
18  In unreported tests, we also considered further alternatives of clustering by state-year and by state-bank-year, but the results remain 
virtually unchanged. These tests are available upon request.   
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results of this exercise are shown in Panel A of Table 12 where we repeat this procedure 1,000 times. 
The rejection rates for all dependent variables are in line with those that would occur through Type 1 
errors. This analysis confirms that state-chartered banks affected by state depositor preference law 
remained unaffected by the subsequent introduction of national depositor preference. 
Finally, we discuss the external validity of our findings. As in any quasi-experiment, a key question 
is to what extent our findings generalize beyond our economic laboratory. The question of 
generalizability is of particular importance for Europe where policy makers and the banking industry 
have been debating the introducing depositor preference for banks in the European Union.
19
  
The enactment of national depositor preference following the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 
1993 allows us to inspect whether the results are externally valid. This law stipulated that all banks are 
henceforth subject to depositor preference.  
Provided that state-chartered banks in states that had previously enacted depositor preference were 
already subject to these provisions, they serve as an ideal control group for an alternative setup using 
difference-in-differences estimation.
20
 For these tests, we extend the sample period to 1997Q3. The 
treatment group consists therefore of all banks in states that had not implemented depositor preference 
law prior to 1993Q3 and nationally-chartered banks in states that had introduced depositor preference 
legislation. Because we rely on cross-state variation in treatment status to identify the treatment effect, 
we cannot include state-quarter controls. Panel B of Table 12 presents the results. Using this new 
treatment, we continue to find the same effect on funding costs as in the main regressions. This test 
highlights the external validity of our inferences.  
[INSERT TABLE 12: FALSIFICATION TEST AND EXTERNAL VALIDITY] 
6. Summary and conclusion 
This article exploits an unexplored natural experiment to inform the debate about market discipline 
using a novel approach. We use the staggered introduction of depositor preference legislation which 
changes the priority of claims on failed banks’ assets in 15 U.S. states between 1983 and 1993. The 
preventative influence of junior debt can be used to establish whether depositors and, more 
importantly, non-depositors whose claims are subordinated under depositor preference to those of 
depositors, monitor and influence bank conduct.  
The progressive nature of the introduction of depositor preference for state-chartered banks provides 
a unique opportunity to overcome the usual identification challenges. The plausible exogeneity of 
these laws with respect to bank behavior which we document in this paper, and the fact that our setting 
allows comparing state-chartered banks with nationally-chartered banks that operate in the same 
federal state enable us to establish a causal link between the seniority of debt claims and bank conduct. 
This issue is of timely importance for policy and regulation.  
While Australia, Argentina, Hong Kong, Malaysia, and the U.S. already have some form of 
depositor preference in place, European policy makers and the banking industry there have engaged in 
intensive and controversial discussions about assigning priority to depositors’ claims in a bank failure. 
The proponents of such legislation argue depositor preference will increase market discipline exerted 
by non-deposit claimants, increase bank soundness, and reduce the cost of bank failures. However, the 
banking industry has lobbied against assigning depositors a priority claim on failed banks’ assets. The 
opponents argue that priority for depositors increases banks’ cost of funds as non-deposit claimants 
seek risk premia that would ultimately undermine soundness. 
Our difference-in-difference estimation strategy evaluates these concerns by exploiting within state-
quarter differences in the reaction of treated and untreated banks. The results highlight that changes in 
                                                          
19  Several media reports and statements by EU policymakers and bankers suggest a lively debate on this matter. While Bloomberg News 
reports on 8th May 2013 that the “EU sees shocks without bank depositor preference rule”, banks in Europe view depositor preference as 
undesirable. The website thisismoney.co.uk reports that “Banks complain depositor preference plan will raise costs for customers” on 
1st June 2012, and Angela Knight, Chief Executive of the British Bankers Association, issued a statement on 13th June 2012 that “”[…] 
depositor preference proposition may work against financial stability and be a turn off for the investors in a bank”.   
20  We exclude state-chartered banks from Arizona, Connecticut, Florida, Maine, Minnesota, New Hampshire, and Rhode Island from the 
control group because these states introduced depositor preference legislation shortly before federal enactment. Excluding these banks 
ensures that the implied counterfactual is not biased by banks reacting to state depositor preference laws. 
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the priority of debt claims give rise to greater monitoring which has wide-ranging implications for the 
banking sector in terms of funding cost, liability structure, soundness, and profitability. 
The key findings based on 199,731 observations for 5,509 banks operating in 15 states in the U.S 
illustrate that non-depositors are a credible source of market discipline. 
 While our regressions show that overall funding costs decline, we document that non-deposit funds 
become more expensive, supporting the idea that depositor preference increases market discipline. The 
effect is also economically significant. For the average state-chartered bank in the sample, introducing 
depositor preference increases the costs on non-deposit funds, scaled by total liabilities, by 22 percent. 
If there are direct pricing effects emerging from the introduction of depositor preference, it is also 
plausible to expect a corresponding quantity effect for uninsured deposits that should coincide with 
increased monitoring by non-depositors. This is indeed what we find. The treatment groups’ market 
share of uninsured deposits increases by 13 percent. Importantly, there are no changes to their market 
share in non-deposits which prompts non-depositors to increase monitoring intensity. 
As the changes in monitoring intensity in this paper are plausibly exogenous, our inferences remain 
intact across a variety of sensitivity checks and falsification exercises. We also show that a series of 
potential alternative explanations and possibly confounding factors such as regional and nation-wide 
banking crises, and a wave of deregulation of banking markets cannot be responsible for the results 
documented in this study.  
We are not only able to present evidence of increased monitoring by non-depositors, but also find 
evidence that the increase in monitoring triggers changes in bank conduct. Our tests that focus on bank 
conduct examine risk taking. We find that Z-scores (ln) increase, and the non-performing loans ratio, 
and the leverage ratio decline significantly. For the average bank in the sample, the Z-score (ln) 
increases by 22 percent. The results from this exercise tie in with theories by Fama (1980, 1985), and 
Rajan and Winton (1995) that predict an inverse association between seniority of debt claims and 
debtholders incentives to monitor.  To this end, this work reiterates the idea to complement regulatory 
discipline by harnessing market forces. Important in this context is the fact that our paper is one of a 
limited number of studies that offer evidence for the influencing dimension of market discipline. 
In sum, we interpret our results as supportive evidence for monitoring by junior claimants as a result 
of the introduction of depositor preference laws. From a policy perspective, our findings therefore 
justify the proposals put forward in the policy community to introduce depositor preference laws in 
Europe. However, we temper our summary by pointing out two issues: First, bank business models 
have undergone changes over the past few decades and the nature of our experimental setting renders 
it infeasible to use more recent data. Second, we do not claim that depositor preference is a panacea to 
constrain bank risk taking.  
Yet, embedded in a system of effective government supervision of banking institutions, protecting 
depositors on the one hand and effectively increasing market discipline on the other hand are 
appealing features of depositor preference legislation that have potential to contribute to improved 
banking system soundness.  
We conclude by pointing out the benefit of capitalizing on this experimental setting. The advantage 
of the experimental setup lies in the fact that the treatment effects are simply measured as the average 
difference between state-chartered and nationally-chartered banks operating in the same 
macroeconomic environment. To that extent, the step-by-step adoption of depositor preference 
legislation can be considered a useful source of exogenous variation in the monitoring incentives of 
debtholders for further empirical work. The interaction of other features of the financial safety net with 
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The Political Economy of Depositor Preference Adoption 
Panel A: Depositor preference law States and Date of Implementation 
State Date Effective In Sample Observations 
Alaska 10/15/1978 No  
Arizona 9/21/1991 Yes 1,211 
California 6/27/1986 Yes 16,433 
Colorado 5/1/1987 Yes 15,811 
Connecticut 5/22/1991 Yes 3,936 
Florida 7/3/1992 Yes 12,960 
Georgia 1974* No  
Hawaii 6/24/1987 Yes 410 
Idaho 1979** No  
Indiana 1943 No  
Iowa 1/1/1970 No  
Kansas 7/1/1985 Yes 23,386 
Louisiana 1/1/1985 Yes 10,255 
Maine 4/16/1991 Yes 1,472 
Minnesota 4/24/1990 Yes 25,431 
Missouri 5/15/1986 Yes 23,263 
Montana 1927 No  
Nebraska 1909 No  
New Hampshire 6/10/1991 Yes 1,863 
New Mexico 6/30/1963 No  
North Dakota 7/1/1987 Yes 6,496 
Oklahoma 5/26/1965 No  
Oregon 1/1/1974 No  
Rhode Island 2/8/1991 Yes 482 
South Dakota 7/1/1969 No  
Tennessee 1969 No  
Texas 8/26/1985*** Yes 58,890 
Utah 1983 No  
Virginia 7/1/1983 No  
West Virginia 5/11/1981 No  
Panel B: Political economy of enacting depositor preference laws 
Dependent variable: Depositor preference law 
State-chartered assets -0.2461   -0.2675 
 (-0.47)   (-0.53) 
S&L crisis  0.5110  0.4901 
  (1.25)  (1.18) 
Assets in all failed banks  0.0013  0.0013 
  (1.15)  (1.10) 
Bank profitability  0.0365  0.0330 
  (0.61)  (0.53) 
Democrat governor   -0.0392 -0.0361 
   (-0.82) (-0.77) 
State FE YES YES YES YES 
Quarter FE YES YES YES YES 
Observations 2,056 2,056 2,056 2,056 
R2 0.8080 0.8100 0.8083 0.8112 
Panel C: Treatment and control group in quarter prior to depositor preference  
 Treatment Control Difference  t-Statistic 
Total interest expenses 0.0145 0.0141 -0.0003 -0.31 
Interest on deposits 0.0146 0.0141 -0.0005 -0.46 
Interest on non-deposits 0.0069 0.0086 0.0017 1.56 
Bank size  11.0949 11.3033 0.2085 0.53 
Equity -0.2645 -2.8834 -0.2589 -1.21 
Notes: This table presents in Panel A the date depositor preference law passed into law in each state.  The 
information is taken from Marino and Bennett (1999).  * indicates that the legislation became effective on 
either January 1 or July 1.  ** indicates passed by both houses on July 1, but that enactment date is unclear.  
Where only the year is indicated, neither the month nor the day of enactment is available. *** Texas 
amended its law in 1993Q2 and did not have depositor preference until national depositor preference was 
enacted in August 1993. Utah enacted depositor preference law legislation during 1983Q1. Panel B shows 
the results of linear probability models examining the reasons for the introduction of depositor preference 
laws. We estimate the model 𝐷𝑃𝐿𝑠𝑡 =  𝛼 +  𝛽𝑋𝑠𝑡 + 𝛾𝑠 + 𝛾𝑡 + 𝜀𝑠𝑡 where 𝐷𝑃𝐿𝑠𝑡 is a dummy equal to 1 if 
depositor preference is in force, 𝑋𝑠𝑡 is a vector containing private-interest (the ratio of state-chartered assets 
to total bank assets), public-interest (the S&L crisis, the natural logarithm of failed banks’ assets in the state, 
mean profitability (ROA) of banks in the state), and political-interest (democratic governor) variables. t-
statistics are reported in parentheses and standard errors are clustered at the state level.  Panel C shows 
differences in means between treatment and control group for the key variables of interest and the 



















Coefficient 1 1 1 1 1.001 1 
Z-stat (0.99) (1.27) (0.34) (0.86) (0.93) (0.35) 
Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES 
State FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 








Return on assets 
(ln) 




Coefficient 3.177 1.376 1.001 2.565 0.618 1.622 
Z-stat (1.37) (1.64) (0.89) (0.39) (-0.37) (1.19) 
Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES 
State FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 1196 1196 1196 1196 1196 1196 
Notes. This table presents Cox proportional hazard (Cox PH) models to verify that adoption of depositor preference law is exogenous with respect to 
banks’ costs of funds, liability structure and health. In the Cox proportional hazard models, the dependent variable is equal to 1 if depositor preference 
law has been enacted, 0 otherwise. The main explanatory variables include totals of interest expenses, interest expenses on deposits, interest expenses on 
non-deposits, liabilities, deposits, non-deposits, the Z-score, non-performing loans, the leverage ratio, return on equity, interest income, total loans, of all 
banks operating in the state. A state is dropped from the analysis in the quarter after it adopts depositor preference law. The vector of control variables 
includes the amount of failed banks’ deposits, estimated losses resulting from bank failures, number of bank failures, the concentration ratio of bank 
deposits (log of HHI), the ratio of total bank assets to GDP, and the logarithm of the unemployment rate. All control variables are aggregated at the state 
level. State and year dummies are included. Robust z-statistics are reported in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard errors are clustered 






































Summary Statistics and Representativeness 
Panel A: Summary Statistics      
Variable N Mean SD Min Max 
Total interest expenses 199,698 1.420 0.423 0.509 7.745 
Interest expenses on deposits 199,698 1.430 0.434 0.297 7.797 
Interest expenses on non-deposits 199,698 0.635 1.225 0 13.084 
Total liabilities 199,698 0.913 0.033 0.763 0.975 
Total domestic deposits 199,698 0.973 0.040 0.713 0.999 
Total non-deposits 199,698 0.027 0.040 0.001 0.286 
Insured deposits 199,698 0.932 0.088 0.501 0.998 
Market share of insured deposits 199,698 0.000 0.000 0 0.001 
Uninsured deposits  199,698 0.039 0.070 0 0.331 
Market share of uninsured deposits 199,698 0.001 0.002 0 0.024 
Zscore (ln) 199,698 1.351 4.887 -6.908 10.618 
Standard deviation of ROA (ln) 199,698 -6.685 0.839 -12.714 -2.124 
Standard deviation of ROA 199,698 0.002 0.003 0.000 0.119 
Return on assets (ln) 199,698 -6.129 0.782 -12.619 -1.506 
Return on assets 199,698 0.003 0.003 0.000 0.222 
Equity to total assets (ln) 199,698 -2.588 0.721 -9.968 -0.047 
Equity to total assets 199,698 0.085 0.034 0.001 0.234 
Non-performing loans to total loans 199,698 0.017 0.023 0 0.107 
Leverage ratio (Debt to equity ratio) 199,698 11.645 4.849 0 30.985 
Return on equity (ln) 199,698 -4.394 1.802 -9.399 4.984 
Return on equity 199,698 0.039 0.489 0.000 146.000 
Total interest income to total loans (ln) 199,698 -3.486 1.204 -6.908 6.535 
Total interest income to total loans 199,698 0.043 0.022 0.001 0.128 
Treatment*Charter 199,698 0.369 0.483 0 1 
Bank size (ln) 199,698 10.635 1.183 5.649 18.591 
Total assets 199,698 108969.1 324164.4 4825 3130040 
Panel B: Sample representativeness 
 
Banks in treatment state 
vs. Banks in all other states 
  
Banks in treatment state  
vs. Banks in all other states 
(including states with depositor  











Total interest expenses 0.000 0.961 0.000 0.741 
Interest expenses on deposits 0.000 0.936 0.000 0.804 
Interest expenses on non-deposits 0.000 0.619 0.000 0.984 
Total liabilities -0.009 0.052 -0.007 0.052 
Total domestic deposits -0.009 0.328 -0.005 0.535 
Total non-deposits 0.009 0.312 0.005 0.535 
Zscore (ln) 0.372 0.183 0.342 0.193 
Non-performing loans to total loans -0.005*** 0.001 -0.003 0.045 
Leverage ratio (Debt to equity ratio) -1.093* 0.028 -0.767* 0.041 
Return on assets (ln) 0.069 0.026 0.087 0.005 
Return on equity (ln) 0.018 0.183 0.082 0.066 
Total interest income to total loans (ln) 0.028 0.936 0.034 0.984 
Notes: Panel A presents summary statistics on all variables used throughout the paper. Panel B tests for representativeness 
















Parallel Trends Tests 
 



















Δ Total interest expenses -0.002 0.702 -0.003 0.819 0.001 0.788 -0.005 0.724 
Δ Interest expenses on deposits 0.000 0.945 0.000 0.984 -0.001 0.756 0.002 0.984 
Δ Interest expenses on non-deposits -0.015 0.984 0.047 0.724 -0.122 0.468 0.031 0.724 
Δ Insured deposits market share 0.002 0.193 -0.009 0.191 0.004 0.141 0.020** 0.011 
Δ Uninsured deposits market share 0.004 0.869 -0.006 0.439 0.032 0.758 0.002 0.917 
Δ Non-deposits market share -0.005 0.467 0.018 0.917 -0.025 0.633 0.005 0.443 
Δ Insured deposits 0.008 0.581 -0.006 0.663 0.002 0.443 0.029 0.395 
Δ Market share of insured deposits 0.011 0.707 -0.003 0.373 0.028 0.468 0.008 0.373 
Δ Uninsured deposits 0.000 0.977 -0.029 0.439 0.056 0.758 -0.023 0.917 
Δ Market share of uninsured deposits -0.001 0.884 -0.048 0.439 0.059 0.999 -0.024 0.917 
Δ Zscore (ln) -0.128 0.308 -0.072 0.263 -0.251 0.867 -0.061 0.901 
Δ Non-performing loans to total loans 0.552 0.977 0.239 0.513 0.002 0.541 1.366 0.600 
Δ Leverage ratio (Debt to equity ratio) 0.001 0.818 -0.023 0.548 -0.002 0.951 0.026 0.272 
Δ Return on equity (ln) -0.003 0.268 0.001 0.967 -0.032 0.279 0.021 0.169 
Δ Total interest income to total loans (ln) 0.002 0.501 0.007 0.101 0.001 0.885 -0.003 0.885 




Pricing effects of depositor preference: Funding Costs 
 Panel A: All states  Panel B: 15 states 
























Charter 0.0444*** 0.0516*** -0.2075*** 0.0498*** 0.0535*** -0.0877*** 0.0077 0.0120 -0.0136  0.0169 0.0195 -0.0822 
  (13.47) (14.53) (-16.53) (14.20) (14.22) (-7.78) (0.97) (1.43) (-0.41)  (1.38) (1.52) (-1.39) 
DPL 0.0412*** 0.0457*** -0.1418*** 0.0338*** 0.0374*** -0.1162***        
 (9.10) (9.77) (-8.47) (7.40) (7.87) (-7.42)        
Charter*DPL -0.0418*** -0.0458*** 0.1515*** -0.0403*** -0.0433*** 0.1186*** -0.0169*** -0.0196*** 0.1214***  -0.0192*** -0.0219*** 0.1388*** 
 (-8.50) (-8.48) (7.81) (-8.13) (-7.95) (6.86) (-3.62) (-4.16) (6.30)  (-4.06) (-4.56) (6.31) 
Bank size     0.0075*** 0.0017 0.2068*** 0.1384*** 0.1415*** 0.0690***  0.1490*** 0.1585*** 0.0897*** 
    (4.48) (0.89) (47.23) (18.75) (18.51) (4.80)  (12.29) (13.14) (3.47) 
Capital ratio    -0.0125*** -0.0101** -0.0560*** -0.0521*** -0.0540*** 0.0082  -0.0347*** -0.0373*** 0.0249** 
    (-4.30) (-2.39) (-8.00) (-16.86) (-16.75) (1.19)  (-11.33) (-10.83) (2.31) 
S&L crisis    0.1693*** 0.1843*** -0.2160***        
    (16.62) (17.60) (-4.24)        
Interstate deregulation    0.0459*** 0.0463*** -0.0113        
    (11.07) (10.87) (-1.39)        
Interstate deregulation    -0.0095*** -0.0082*** -0.0413***        
    (-3.34) (-2.79) (-4.94)        
State FE YES YES YES YES YES YES        
Quarter FE YES YES YES YES YES YES        
Bank FE       YES YES YES  YES YES YES 
State*Quarter FE       YES YES YES  YES YES YES 
Observations 528,522 528,522 528,522 528,522 528,522 528,522 528,522 528,522 528,522  199,731 199,731 199,731 
R2 0.4849 0.4710 0.0395 0.4871 0.4725 0.0832 0.7041 0.7040 0.3512  0.6797 0.6855 0.0271 
Number of banks 15,392 15,392 15,392 15,392 15,392 15,392 15,392 15,392 15,392  5,509 5,509 5,509 
Notes. We present the results of difference-in-difference regressions examining the effect of state depositor preference law enactment on banks’ costs of funds. Panel A contains results using data from all 50 states whereas Panel B uses data from the 
15 states that enacted depositor preference law between 1983Q1 and 1993Q2. We estimate 𝑦𝑖𝑠𝑡 =  𝛼 + 𝛽𝐷𝑃𝐿𝑠𝑡 ∗ 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖 +  𝛿𝑋𝑖𝑠𝑡 + 𝛾𝑖 + 𝛾𝑠𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑠𝑡, where 𝑦 denotes the dependent variable of bank i in state s at time t, which include ratios of: total 
interest expenses to total liabilities (Total interest expenses), interest on deposits to total deposits (Interest on deposits), and interest on other non-deposits to total other non-deposits (Interest on non-deposits). The main explanatory variable is an 
interaction between the depositor preference law dummy and the charter dummy variable. DPLst is a dummy variable equal to 1 for all banks in states and years following introduction of state depositor preference law, and 0 otherwise; Charteri is a 
dummy variable equal to 1 for all state-chartered banks, and 0 for nationally-chartered institutions. The coefficient β provides information about the effect of state depositor preference law adoption. The set of bank-time varying control variables Xist 
include the logarithm of banks’ total assets (Bank size), the ratio of equity capital to total assets (Capital ratio), inter- and intra-state deregulation dummy variables, and an S&L crisis proxy (measured as the ratio of failed thrift assets to total bank 














Quantity effects and long-run effects of depositor preference 
Panel A: Quantity effects in terms of market shares 
Dependent variable Insured deposits Uninsured deposits Non-deposits 
Charter*DPL -0.0080 0.1305** 0.0172 
 (-0.35) (2.26) (0.27) 
Bank size -0.0819 -0.0388 0.1385 
 (-1.51) (-1.14) (1.75) 
Capital ratio -0.0058 -0.0312 -0.0198 
 (-0.31) (-0.48) (-0.32) 
State-charter FE YES YES YES 
State*Quarter FE YES YES YES 
Observations 1,286 1,286 1,286 
R2 0.0959 0.8396 0.0416 
Number of state-charters 30 30 30 
Panel B: Long-run effects of depositor preference laws 
Dependent variable Total interest expenses Interest on deposits Interest on non-deposits 
Charter 0.0486*** 0.0515*** -0.1163** 
 (3.27) (3.30) (-1.99) 
Charter * post quarter0 -0.0571*** -0.0587*** 0.0271 
 (-7.92) (-7.95) (0.75) 
Charter * post quarter1 -0.0555*** -0.0595*** 0.0789** 
 (-7.77) (-7.54) (2.10) 
Charter * post quarter2 -0.0722*** -0.0758*** 0.1073*** 
 (-9.82) (-10.03) (3.19) 
Charter * post quarter3 -0.0759*** -0.0803*** 0.1751*** 
 (-11.07) (-11.36) (5.90) 
Charter * post quarter4 -0.0717*** -0.0763*** 0.1370*** 
 (-10.45) (-10.99) (3.99) 
Charter * post quarter5 -0.0550*** -0.0587*** 0.1148*** 
 (-7.28) (-7.77) (3.11) 
Charter * post quarter6 -0.0693*** -0.0708*** 0.1534*** 
 (-9.47) (-9.37) (4.61) 
Charter * post quarter7 -0.0863*** -0.0891*** 0.1062*** 
 (-11.12) (-11.17) (3.28) 
Charter * post quarter8 -0.1164*** -0.1197*** 0.1152*** 
 (-13.63) (-13.78) (3.48) 
Charter * post quarter9 -0.1218*** -0.1255*** 0.1682*** 
 (-16.20) (-15.87) (5.67) 
Bank size  -0.1152*** -0.1245*** 0.2126*** 
 (-17.34) (-18.29) (11.49) 
Capital ratio -0.0994*** -0.1074*** 0.0822*** 
 (-21.65) (-21.56) (7.27) 
Bank FE YES YES YES 
State*Quarter FE YES YES YES 
Observations 258,594 258,594 258,594 
R2 0.5313 0.5448 0.1583 
Number of banks 5,509 5,509 5,509 
Notes. This table presents in Panel A results of difference-in-difference regressions examining the effect of state depositor 
preference law enactment on banks’ market share on the state level for insured, uninsured deposits, and non-deposits. We estimate 
𝑦𝑖𝑠𝑡 =  𝛼 + 𝛽𝐷𝑃𝐿𝑠𝑡 ∗ 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖 +  𝛿𝑋𝑖𝑠𝑡 + 𝛾𝑖 + 𝛾𝑠𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑠𝑡, where 𝑦 denotes dependent variable of bank charter i (state or national 
charter) in state s at time t, which includes: the market share of insured deposits,  the market share of uninsured deposits, and the 
market share of non-deposits. The main explanatory variable is an interaction between the depositor preference law and Charter 
dummy variables. DPLst is a dummy variable equal to 1 for all banks in states and years following introduction of state depositor 
preference law, and 0 otherwise; Charteri is a dummy variable equal to 1 for state-chartered banks, and 0 for nationally-chartered 
institutions. The coefficient β provides information about the effect of state depositor preference law adoption. The set of bank-time 
varying control variables Xist include the logarithm of mean banks’ total assets (Bank size), and the mean ratio of equity capital to 
total assets (Capital ratio). Additionally, the regressions include state-quarter-fixed effects (𝛾𝑠𝑡) and charter-fixed effects (𝛾𝑖). Panel 
B presents the results of difference-in-difference regressions examining the long-run effect of state depositor preference law 
enactment on banks’ costs of funds. We estimate 𝑦𝑖𝑠𝑡 =  𝛼 + ∑ 𝛽𝑗
𝑗=9
𝑗=0 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖 ∗ 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑗 +  𝛿𝑋𝑖𝑠𝑡 + 𝛾𝑖 + 𝛾𝑠𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑠𝑡, where 𝑦 
denotes the dependent variable of bank i in state s at time t, which include ratios of: total interest expenses to total liabilities (Total 
interest expenses), interest on deposits to total deposits (Interest on deposits), and interest on other non-deposits to total other non-
deposits (Interest on non-deposits). The main explanatory variable is an interaction between the depositor preference law dummy 
and Charter dummy variable. 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑗 where 𝑗 =∈ (1, … ,8) is a dummy variable equal to 1 for each quarter after enactment 
of depositor preference in state s. 𝑗 = 0 denotes the quarter of enactment. 𝑗 = 9 denotes all quarters two years after the date of 
enactment. Charteri is a dummy variable equal to 1 for all state-chartered banks, and 0 for nationally-chartered institutions. The 
coefficient βj provides information about the effect of state depositor preference law adoption. The set of bank-time varying control 
variables X include the logarithm of banks’ total assets (Bank size), and the ratio of equity capital to total assets (Capital ratio. 
Additionally, the regressions include state-quarter-fixed effects (𝛾𝑠𝑡) and bank-fixed effects (𝛾𝑖). t-statistics are reported in 






Table 7  
Bank health and profitability 
  Panel A: Banks’ risk and decomposed Z-Score (ln)  Panel B: Banks’ profitability 
Dependent variable ZSCORE(ln) ROASD(ln) ROA(ln) ETA(ln) NPL LEV 
 
ROE(ln) TIINC(ln) 
Charter 0.3901** -0.1105* 0.1033** 0.1416*** -0.0006 0.1080  0.0797 -0.0441*** 
 (2.45) (-1.72) (2.42) (2.87) (-0.37) (0.35)  (1.04) (-2.77) 
Charter * DPL 0.2249*** -0.0310 0.0394*** 0.0964*** -0.0009* -0.1763*  0.0406** 0.0151** 
 
(5.26) (-1.58) (3.20) (7.12) (-1.78) (-1.78)  (1.99) (2.51) 









(2.58) (-7.76) (11.91) (-12.08) (-6.00) (14.04)  (12.48) (-1.28) 
Bank FE YES YES YES YES YES YES  YES YES 
State*Quarter FE YES YES YES YES YES YES  YES YES 
Observations 199,731 199,731 199,731 199,731 199,731 199,731  199,731 199,731 
R-squared 0.9242 0.0925 0.3974 0.1372 0.1888 0.1464  0.6764 0.9526 
Number of banks 5,509 5,509 5,509 5,509 5,509 5,509  5,509 5,509 
 Notes. This table presents the results of difference-in-difference regressions examining the effect of state depositor preference law enactment on banks’ health in Panel A and on profitability 
in Panel B. We estimate 𝑦𝑖𝑠𝑡 =  𝛼 + 𝛽𝐷𝑃𝐿𝑠𝑡 ∗ 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖 +  𝛿𝑋𝑖𝑠𝑡 + 𝛾𝑖 + 𝛾𝑠𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑠𝑡, where 𝑦 denotes the dependent variables of bank i in state s at time t. In Panel A the dependent variables 
that proxy for banks’ health are: the logarithm of the Z-score, the components of the Z-score measure (ZSCORE(ln)), the ratio of equity capital to total assets (ETA (ln)), the logarithm of 
return on assets (ROA (ln)), the logarithm of the standard deviation of return on assets (ROASD (ln)), the ratio of non-performing loans to total loans  (NPL), and the debt to equity leverage 
ratio (LEV). In Panel B the dependent variables proxy for banks’ profitability: the logarithm of return on equity (ROE (ln)), and the logarithm of total interest income to total loans (TIINC). 
The main explanatory variable is an interaction between the depositor preference law and Charter dummy variables. DPLst is a dummy variable equal to 1 for all banks in states and years 
following introduction of state depositor preference law, and 0 otherwise; Charteri is a dummy variable equal to 1 for all state-chartered banks, and 0 for nationally-chartered institutions. The 
coefficient β provides information about the effect of state depositor preference law adoption. The set of bank-time varying control variables X include the logarithm of banks’ total assets 
(Bank size). Additionally, the regressions include state-quarter-fixed effects (𝛾𝑠𝑡) and bank-fixed effects (𝛾𝑖). Robust t-statistics are reported in parentheses and standard errors are clustered 








Interactions with bank size and switching of bank charters 
Panel A: Interactions with bank size 
 Total interest expenses Interest on deposits Interest on non-deposits 
Charter 0.2150 0.1191 -0.0885 
 (1.40) (0.78) (-0.24) 
Charter * DPL -0.0192*** -0.0250*** 0.1298*** 
 (-3.08) (-3.88) (5.59) 
Bank size  0.1663*** 0.1713*** 0.1013*** 
 (11.72) (12.05) (2.94) 
Capital ratio -0.0326*** -0.0354*** 0.0272** 
 (-10.66) (-10.08) (2.52) 
Bank size * DPL -0.0163*** -0.0164*** -0.0239*** 
 (-6.28) (-5.95) (-2.84) 
Bank size * Charter -0.0184 -0.0093 0.0006 
 (-1.27) (-0.64) (0.02) 
Bank FE YES YES YES 
State*Quarter FE YES YES YES 
Observations 199,731 199,731 199,731 
R-squared 0.6802 0.6860 0.0272 
Number of banks 5,509 5,509 5,509 
Panel B: Charter switch  Panel C: Removing banks which switch their charter 
Dependent variable   Total interest expenses Interest on deposits Interest on non-deposits 
DPL -0.0003     
 (-1.01)     
Charter * DPL   -0.0121*** -0.0134*** 0.1099*** 
   (-2.66) (-2.91) (4.77) 
Bank size  0.0004  0.1816*** 0.1942*** 0.0942*** 
 (0.88)  (13.00) (14.02) (3.34) 
Equity 0.0002  -0.0362*** -0.0393*** 0.0346*** 
 (1.00)  (-11.10) (-10.56) (3.12) 
Bank FE YES  YES YES YES 
State*Quarter FE NO  YES YES YES 
State FE NO     
Quarter FE YES     
Observations 147,367  170,873 170,873 170,873 
R-squared 0.0360  0.5642 0.5756 0.0218 
Number of banks 5,509  5,454 5,454 5,454 
Notes: Panel A appends equation (2) with interactions between bank size and the 𝐷𝑃𝐿𝑠𝑡 and the 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖 dummy variables. Panel B presents results for probit regressions where our dependent variable is a dummy 
variable equal to 1 when bank switches charter and 0 otherwise. Panel C shows regressions identical to those reported in Table 5 except for the fact that we omit banks which switch their charter. We estimate 𝑦𝑖𝑠𝑡 =
 𝛼 + 𝛽𝐷𝑃𝐿𝑠𝑡 ∗ 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖 +  𝛿𝑋𝑖𝑠𝑡 + 𝛾𝑖 + 𝛾𝑠𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑠𝑡, where 𝑦 denotes the dependent variable of bank i in state s at time t, which include ratios of: total interest expenses to total liabilities (Total interest expenses), 
interest on deposits to total deposits (Interest on deposits), and interest on other non-deposits to total other non-deposits (Interest on non-deposits). The main explanatory variable is an interaction between the depositor 
preference law and Charter dummy variables. DPLst is a dummy variable equal to 1 for all banks in states and years following introduction of state depositor preference law, and 0 otherwise; Charteri is a dummy 
variable equal to 1 for all state-chartered banks, and 0 for nationally-chartered institutions. The set of bank-time varying control variables X includes the logarithm of banks’ total assets (Bank size), and the ratio of 
equity capital to total assets (Capital ratio). Additionally, the regressions in Panels A and C include state-quarter-fixed effects (𝛾𝑠𝑡) and bank-fixed effects (𝛾𝑖). Robust t-statistics are reported in parentheses and 





Confounding events: Banking crises in New England, Texas, and turmoil in the S&L industry 
 Panel A: New England  Panel B: Texas  Panel C: S&L Crisis 


















Charter 0.0018 0.0027 -0.0563  0.0195 0.0223* -0.0967  0.0185 0.0213* -0.0829 
 (0.16) (0.24) (-0.97)  (1.50) (1.65) (-1.62)  (1.51) (1.66) (-1.40) 
Charter*DPL -0.0111** -0.0137*** 0.1338***  -0.0192*** -0.0216*** 0.1250***  -0.0201*** -0.0235*** 0.1420*** 
 (-2.46) (-2.99) (6.05)  (-3.82) (-4.23) (5.46)  (-4.13) (-4.78) (6.23) 
Bank size  0.1343*** 0.1462*** 0.0783***  0.1468*** 0.1565*** 0.0745***  0.1489*** 0.1584*** 0.0897*** 
 (12.13) (13.08) (3.38)  (11.41) (12.38) (2.74)  (12.28) (13.14) (3.47) 
Capital ratio -0.0336*** -0.0364*** 0.0250**  -0.0355*** -0.0383*** 0.0171  -0.0346*** -0.0372*** 0.0250** 
 (-11.13) (-10.69) (2.35)  (-9.49) (-9.15) (1.43)  (-11.30) (-10.80) (2.32) 
Charter * S&L crisis         -0.1703* -0.1872** 0.0809 
         (-1.72) (-2.14) (0.16) 
Charter * DPL & S&L crisis         0.1581 0.1840** -0.1284 
         (1.57) (2.06) (-0.25) 
Bank FE YES YES YES  YES YES YES  YES YES YES 
State*Quarter FE YES YES YES  YES YES YES  YES YES YES 
Observations 195,010 195,010 195,010  163,471 163,471 163,471  199,731 199,731 199,731 
R2 0.6946 0.7020 0.0256  0.6626 0.6696 0.0273  0.6797 0.6855 0.0270 
Number of banks 5,411 5,411 5,411  5,506 5,506 5,506  5,509 5,509 5,509 
Notes. This table presents the results of difference-in-difference regressions examining the effect of state depositor preference law enactment on banks’ costs of funds. We consider banking crises as 
confounding events and remove Connecticut, Maine, New Hampshire, and Rhode Island in Panel A from the sample. We remove observations for Texas from the sample in Panel B. Panel C focuses on 
the S&L crisis by including additional interaction terms between the dummy for state charters and our proxy for the S&L crisis, and a triple interaction term between the dummy for state-chartered banks, 
the dummy variable for depositor preference, and the proxy for the S&L crisis. We estimate 𝑦𝑖𝑠𝑡 =  𝛼 + 𝛽𝐷𝑃𝐿𝑠𝑡 ∗ 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖 +  𝛿𝑋𝑖𝑠𝑡 + 𝛾𝑖 + 𝛾𝑠𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑠𝑡, where 𝑦 denotes the dependent variable of bank i in 
state s at time t, which include ratios of: total interest expenses to total liabilities (Total interest expenses), interest on deposits to total deposits (Interest on deposits), and interest on other non-deposits to 
total other non-deposits (Interest on non-deposits). The main explanatory variable is an interaction between the depositor preference law dummy and Charter dummy variable. DPLst is a dummy variable 
equal to 1 for all banks in states and years following introduction of state depositor preference law, and 0 otherwise; Charteri is a dummy variable equal to 1 for all state-chartered banks, and 0 for 
nationally-chartered institutions. The coefficient β provides information about the effect of state depositor preference law adoption. The set of bank-time varying control variables X include the logarithm 
of banks’ total assets (Bank size), the ratio of equity capital to total assets (Capital ratio), inter- and intra-state deregulation dummy variables, and an S&L crisis proxy (measured as the ratio of failed thrift 
assets to total bank assets in the state). Additionally, the regressions include state-quarter-fixed effects (𝛾𝑠𝑡) and bank-fixed effects (𝛾𝑖). t-statistics are reported in parentheses and standard errors are 








Confounding events: Regulation and deregulation of banking markets 
  Panel A: Excluding FIRREA period  Panel B: Excluding FDICIA period  Panel C: Deregulation of banking markets 


























Charter  0.0311 0.0327 -0.0057  0.0065 0.0092 -0.0807  0.0185 0.0210 -0.0968 
  (1.28) (1.30) (-0.06)  (0.47) (0.65) (-1.21)  (1.47) (1.60) (-1.61) 
Charter*DPL  -0.0313*** -0.0337*** 0.1414***  -0.0116** -0.0132*** 0.1161***  -0.0161*** -0.0199*** 0.1174*** 
  (-4.69) (-4.83) (5.16)  (-2.51) (-2.81) (4.98)  (-3.44) (-4.17) (4.23) 
Bank size   0.3264*** 0.3469*** 0.1158***  0.1821*** 0.1948*** 0.0909***  0.1488*** 0.1584*** 0.0910*** 
  (14.75) (15.52) (3.26)  (13.26) (14.30) (3.23)  (12.29) (13.14) (3.51) 
Capital ratio  -0.0960*** -0.0999*** 0.0135  -0.0366*** -0.0397*** 0.0348***  -0.0345*** -0.0372*** 0.0240** 
  (-16.34) (-16.21) (0.98)  (-11.25) (-10.70) (3.14)  (-11.26) (-10.76) (2.23) 
Charter * Interstate          -0.0075 -0.0047 0.0288 
          (-0.80) (-0.49) (0.79) 
Charter * Interstate * DPL          0.0059 0.0056 0.0247 
          (0.65) (0.60) (0.61) 
Charter * Intrastate          -0.0028 -0.0056 0.0614 
          (-0.18) (-0.41) (1.23) 
Charter * Intrastate * DPL          -0.0032 -0.0020 -0.0703 
          (-0.21) (-0.15) (-1.39) 
Bank FE  YES YES YES  YES YES YES  YES YES YES 
State*Quarter FE  YES YES YES  YES YES YES  YES YES YES 
Observations  137,401 137,401 137,401  172,696 172,696 172,696  199,731 199,731 199,731 
R2  0.8923 0.8925 0.1619  0.5609 0.5723 0.0215  0.6797 0.6855 0.0271 
Number of banks  5,471 5,471 5,471  5,508 5,508 5,508  5,509 5,509 5,509 
Notes. This table presents the results of difference-in-difference regressions examining the effect of state depositor preference law enactment on banks’ costs of funds. To rule out the role of changes in regulation, 
we remove in Panel A observations between 1989Q4 and 1993Q2 to consider the effect of FIRREA. Panel B removes observations between 1991Q4 and 1993Q2 to consider the effect of FDICIA. Panel C presents 
the results of difference-in-difference-in-difference regressions examining the robustness of the results to including interstate and intrastate deregulation interactions. For Panel A and B, we estimate 𝑦𝑖𝑠𝑡 =
 𝛼 + 𝛽𝐷𝑃𝐿𝑠𝑡 ∗ 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖 +  𝛿𝑋𝑖𝑠𝑡 + 𝛾𝑖 + 𝛾𝑠𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑠𝑡, where 𝑦 denotes the dependent variable of bank i in state s at time t, which include ratios of: total interest expenses to total liabilities (Total interest expenses), 
interest on deposits to total deposits (Interest on deposits), and interest on other non-deposits to total other non-deposits (Interest on non-deposits). The main explanatory variable is an interaction between the 
depositor preference law dummy and Charter dummy variable. In Panel C, we estimate 𝑦𝑖𝑠𝑡 =  𝛼 + 𝛽𝐷𝑃𝐿𝑠𝑡 ∗ 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖 + 𝜌𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖 ∗ 𝑍𝑠𝑡 +  𝜑𝐷𝑃𝐿𝑠𝑡 ∗ 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖 ∗ 𝑍𝑠𝑡 +  𝛿𝑋𝑖𝑠𝑡 + 𝛾𝑖 + 𝛾𝑠𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑠𝑡 . . 𝑍𝑠𝑡 is a vector 
containing either interstate or intrastate deregulation dummies taken from Strahan (2003). DPLst is a dummy variable equal to 1 for all banks in states and years following introduction of state depositor preference 
law, and 0 otherwise; Charteri is a dummy variable equal to 1 for all state-chartered banks, and 0 for nationally-chartered institutions. The coefficient β provides information about the effect of state depositor 
preference law adoption. The set of bank-time varying control variables X include the logarithm of banks’ total assets (Bank size), the ratio of equity capital to total assets (Equity), inter- and intra-state deregulation 
dummy variables, and an S&L crisis proxy (measured as the ratio of failed thrift assets to total bank assets in the state). Additionally, the regressions include state-quarter-fixed effects (𝛾𝑠𝑡) and bank-fixed effects 








Further sensitivity tests 
 Panel A: Random assignment  Panel B: Anticipation effects 
Dependent variable Total interest  
Expenses 
Interest on  
deposits 
Interest on  
non-deposits 
 Total interest  
expenses 
Interest on  
deposits 
Interest on  
non-deposits 
Charter     0.0178 0.0204 -0.0857 
     (1.45) (1.59) (-1.44) 
Charter * DPL     -0.0200*** -0.0228*** 0.1422*** 
     (-4.07) (-4.59) (6.27) 
Placebo treatment -0.0000 -0.0000 0.0001  -0.0017 -0.0017 0.0068 
 
(-0.47) (-1.26) (1.13)  (-0.66) (-0.67) (0.69) 
Bank size 0.0014*** 0.0014*** 0.0013***  0.1490*** 0.1585*** 0.0897*** 
 
(8.88) (8.28) (3.92)  (12.29) (13.14) (3.47) 
Equity -0.0003*** -0.0003*** 0.0001  -0.0347*** -0.0373*** 0.0249** 
 
(-9.10) (-9.30) (0.77)  (-11.32) (-10.83) (2.31) 
Bank FE YES YES YES  YES YES YES 
State*Quarter FE YES YES YES  YES YES YES 
Observations 69,854 69,854 69,854  199,731 199,731 199,731 
R-squared 0.7822 0.7800 0.3230  0.6797 0.6855 0.0271 
Number of banks 3,077 3,077 3,077  5,509 5,509 5,509 
 
Panel C: Regressions excluding time-varying 
controls 
 Panel D: Collapsing  
technique 




Total interest  
Expenses 
Interest on  
deposits 
Interest on  
non-deposits 












Charter 0.0281** 0.0313** -0.0704  -0.0530 -0.0531 0.0742  0.0289*** 0.0316*** -0.0503 
 (2.19) (2.33) (-1.19)  (-1.24) (-1.25) (0.23)  (4.02) (4.50) (-1.55) 
Charter*DPL -0.0370*** -0.0410*** 0.1336***  -0.0106** -0.0122*** 0.0633**  -0.0371*** -0.0401*** 0.1204*** 
 
(-7.52) (-8.21) (6.02)  (-2.50) (-2.75) (2.43)  (-15.46) (-16.79) (10.91) 
Bank FE YES YES YES  YES YES YES  YES YES YES 
State*Quarter FE YES YES YES  YES YES YES  YES YES YES 
Observations 199,731 199,731 199,731  10,541 10,541 10,541  199,698 199,698 199,698 
R-squared 0.6683 0.6728 0.0266  0.7507 0.7405 0.0331  0.7451 0.7591 0.3046 
Number of banks 5,509 5,509 5,509  5,504 5,504 5,504  5,509 5,509 5,509 
Notes. We present difference-in-difference regressions examining the robustness of the main results. Panel A shows regressions that estimate 𝑦𝑖𝑠𝑡 =  𝛼 + 𝛽𝐷𝑃𝐿𝑠𝑡 ∗ 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖 + 𝜌𝑃𝑙𝑎𝑐𝑒𝑏𝑜𝑖𝑠𝑡 +  𝛿𝑋𝑖𝑠𝑡 + 𝛾𝑖 + 𝛾𝑠𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑠𝑡, where 𝑦 denotes 
the dependent variable of bank i in state s at time t, which include ratios of: total interest expenses to total liabilities (Total interest expenses), interest on deposits to total deposits (Interest on deposits), and interest on other non-
deposits to total other non-deposits (Interest on non-deposits). In Panel A we include only national chartered banks in the sample and randomly assign banks to a placebo treatment which is equal to 1 if a depositor preference is in 
force, 0 otherwise. In Panel B we use the full sample and randomly assign the placebo treatment to state-chartered banks before depositor preference is enacted. The coefficient 𝜌 provides information about the effect of placebo 
treatment on banks’ cost of debt and liability structure. Panel C shows difference-in-difference regressions which omit all time-varying control variables. Panel D collapse all observations prior to treatment into one observation at the 
mean, and we follow an identical approach for the observations following the treatment. Panel E clusters standard errors by state, bank, and year. We estimate 𝑦𝑖𝑠𝑡 =  𝛼 + 𝛽𝐷𝑃𝐿𝑠𝑡 ∗ 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖 +  𝛿𝑋𝑖𝑠𝑡 + 𝛾𝑖 + 𝛾𝑠𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑠𝑡, where 𝑦 denotes 
the dependent variable of bank i in state s at time t, which include ratios of: total interest expenses to total liabilities (Total interest expenses), interest on deposits to total deposits (Interest on deposits), and interest on other non-
deposits to total other non-deposits (Interest on non-deposits). The main explanatory variable is an interaction between the depositor preference law dummy and Charter dummy variable. DPLst is a dummy variable equal to 1 for all 
banks in states and years following introduction of state depositor preference law, and 0 otherwise; Charteri is a dummy variable equal to 1 for all state-chartered banks, and 0 for nationally-chartered institutions. The coefficient β 
provides information about the effect of state depositor preference law adoption. The set of bank-time varying control variables in Panel D and Panel E include the logarithm of banks’ total assets (Bank size), the ratio of equity capital 
to total assets (Capital ratio), inter- and intra-state deregulation dummy variables, and an S&L crisis proxy (measured as the ratio of failed thrift assets to total bank assets in the state). Additionally, the regressions include state-





Falsification exercise and external validity: The effect of national depositor preference (Sample 1983Q1-1997Q3) 
Panel A: Monte Carlo simulations for the effect of national depositor preference 
Total interest expenses   Interest on deposits  Interest on non-deposits  
Number of replications:  Number of replications:  Number of replications: 
1,000  1,000  1,000 
Rejection rate at the 1% level  Rejection rate at the 1% level  Rejection rate at the 1% level 
(2-tailed test):  (2-tailed test):  (2-tailed test): 
0.7%  1.1%  1.2% 
Rejection rate at the 5% level  Rejection rate at the 5% level  Rejection rate at the 5% level 
(2-tailed test):  (2-tailed test):  (2-tailed test): 
4.0%  5.7 %  4.9% 
Rejection rate at the 10% level  Rejection rate at the 10% level  Rejection rate at the 10% level 
(2-tailed test):  (2-tailed test):  (2-tailed test): 
7.8%  11.0%  9.5% 
Panel B: The effect of national depositor preference 
Dependent variable  Total interest expenses  Interest on deposits Interest on non-deposits 
Treatment group  0.0042  0.0065 -0.0418 
  (0.62)  (0.89) (-0.70) 
National DPL  -0.8503***  -0.8556*** -0.1747*** 
  (-155.13)  (-148.97) (-6.24) 
Treatment group * national DPL  -0.0160***  -0.0327*** 0.1754*** 
  (-5.86)  (-9.84) (5.90) 
Bank size   0.1107***  0.1068*** 0.1381*** 
  (25.18)  (22.72) (7.87) 
Capital ratio  -0.0439***  -0.0500*** 0.0567*** 
  (-17.72)  (-18.24) (5.97) 
Bank FE  YES  YES YES 
Quarter FE  YES  YES YES 
Observations  600,910  600,910 600,910 
R2  0.6917  0.6813 0.1269 
Number of banks  14,656  14,656 14,656 
Notes: This table presents Monte Carlo simulations in Panel A. We estimate the regression 𝑦𝑖𝑠𝑡 =  𝛼 + 𝛽𝑝𝑙𝑎𝑐𝑒𝑏𝑜𝑖𝑠𝑡 +  𝛿𝑋𝑖𝑠𝑡 + 𝛾𝑖 + 𝛾𝑠𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑠𝑡 using data on state-chartered banks between 
1989Q3 and 1997Q3. We randomly assign banks to placebo treatment status and set 𝑝𝑙𝑎𝑐𝑒𝑏𝑜𝑖𝑠𝑡 equal to 1 for ‘treated’ banks and equal to 0 for ‘untreated’ banks during the period 
1993Q3 to 1997Q3. For all time periods before 1993Q3 𝑝𝑙𝑎𝑐𝑒𝑏𝑜𝑖𝑠𝑡 equals 0. We then estimate the regression and save the p-value on the coefficient 𝛽 and repeat this process 1,000 times 
and compute the rejection rates of the null hypothesis 𝛽 = 0 at the  1%, 5%, and 10% levels. Panel B shows a test of external validity by examining the effect of national depositor 
preference law, introduced in 1993Q3, on banks’ cost of funds. In this test, the treatment group consists of both national and state banks that had not implemented depositor preference 
prior to 1993Q3. These tests do not include state-quarter controls because we rely on cross-state variation in treatment status to identify the effect of national depositor preference. We use 
difference-in-difference regressions and estimate 𝑦𝑖𝑠𝑡 =  𝛼 + 𝛽𝑁𝐷𝑃𝐿𝑠𝑡 ∗ 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖 +  𝛿𝑋𝑖𝑠𝑡 + 𝛾𝑖 + 𝛾𝑠𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑠𝑡, where 𝑦 denotes the dependent variable of bank i in state s at time t, which 
include ratios of: total interest expenses to total liabilities (Total interest expenses), interest on deposits to total deposits (Interest on deposits), and interest on other non-deposits to total 
other non-deposits (Interest on non-deposits). The main explanatory variable is an interaction between the national depositor preference law dummy and Charter dummy variable. NDPLst 
is a dummy variable equal to 1 for all banks in states and years following introduction of national depositor preference law, and 0 otherwise. The coefficient β provides information about 
the effect of national depositor preference law. The set of bank-time varying control variables Xist include the logarithm of banks’ total assets (Bank size), and the ratio of equity capital to 
total assets (Capital ratio). Additionally, the regressions include bank-fixed effects and quarter-fixed effects. t-statistics are reported in parentheses and standard errors are clustered on the 













Notes: Figure 2 illustrates the behavior of quarterly changes in the dependent variables, for three quarters preceding depositor preference law enactment. State-chartered banks (the treatment group) are represented by a 
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Appendix A:  Details on the introduction of depositor preference laws for each state 
Arizona (21
st
 September 1991) 
Party control  
Governor: R  Party control upper and lower house: R 
Legal provision  
Priority of claims; interest 
A. Claims allowed in a proceeding under this article shall be paid in the following order:  
1. Costs and expenses of the administration of the receivership and liquidation. 
2. Taxes due to this state. 
3. Claims with priority under the laws of this state and under federal law. 
4. Claims of creditors that are fully secured including contract claims for interest to 
the date of payment.  
5. Claims of depositors. 
6. Claims of general creditors.  
7. Claims on obligations that are subordinated to the claims of general creditors.  
B. Claims that are approved shall bear interest calculated as provided by law or by 
judgement from the date that the court grants the superintendent’s application for the 
appointment of a receiver for that bank to the extent that monies are available to pay 
that interest. If monies are not available to pay interest, the interest shall be prorated. 
Interest owned shall receive the same priority as the claim on which it accrues, but 
interest on a claim shall not be paid until all claims with that same class have receive 
payment of the full principal amount of the claim.   
C. Any monies remaining after the payment of claims as provided in this section shall be 
returned to the stockholders of the bank as prescribed by this article.  
Further particulars and coinciding factors 
The ongoing bank merger wave affects many counties in Arizona. A merger between 
BankAmerica and Security Pacific and the NCNB-C&S Sovran consolidation result in 





 June 1986)  
Party control  
Governor: R  Party control upper and lower house: D 
Legal provision 
(a) Expenses and claims of unsecured creditors have priority in the following order: 
(1) Expenses of liquidation and approved claims for fees and assessments due the 
department. 
(2) Approved claims given priority under other provisions of state or federal law, 
including, but not limited to, Sections 3114 and 3240.  
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(3) Approved claims for “deposits”, as that term is defined in 12 U.S.C. Section 
1813(l), but including obligations of the type described in 12 U.S.C. Section 
1813(l) (5) (A) and (B). 
(4) Approved claims for other general liabilities. 
(5) Approved claims for obligations subordinated to deposits and other general 
liabilities. 
 (b) Interest shall be given the same priority as the claim on which it is based, but no 
interest shall be paid on any claim until the principal of all claims within the same 
class has been paid or adequately provided for in full. 
(c) Any funds remaining shall be paid to shareholders.  
 
Further particulars and coinciding factors 
The authorities also emphasize that these provisions facilitate the structuring of purchase and 
assumption transactions and enable depositors to have quick access to their funds.  
The savings and loans crisis gets much attention in the press after Seapointe Savings and Loan 
Association collapses, and the bank merger wave also affects many counties in California. 
Energy prices are reported to decline. 
Colorado (1
st
 May 1987) 
Party control  
Governor: D   Party control upper and lower house:  R 
Legal provision  
Liquidation by commissioner – procedure. (9) (a) On liquidation of a state bank, after payment 
of federal deposit insurance, claims for payment have the following priority: 
(I) Obligations incurred by the commission, fees and assessment due to the division, 
and expenses of liquidation, all of which may be covered by a proper reserve of 
funds; 
(II) Claims of depositors having an approved claim against the general liquidation 
account of the bank; 
(III) Claims of general creditors having an approved claim against the general 
liquidating account of the bank; 
(IV) Claims otherwise proper that were not filed within the time prescribed by this code; 
(V) Approved claims of subordinate creditors; and 
(VI) Claims of stockholders of the bank.  
Further particulars and coinciding factors 
Big bank holding companies and the thrift industry report weak performance.  
Connecticut (22
nd
 May 1991) 
Party control  




Section 1.  Section 36-51 of the general statutes is repealed and the following is substituted in 
lieu thereof: 
  (a)  The avails of the property of any capital stock bank organized under the laws of this 
state in the hands of a receiver shall be distributed in the following order of priority:    
(1) The charges and expenses of settling its affairs;  
(2) the circulating  notes, if any;    
(3) all deposits;    
(4) all sums which have  been subscribed and paid in  for its stock by the state 
or the school fund;    
(5) all other liabilities;    and     
(6) the claims of stockholders. 
 
Further particulars and coinciding factors 
Connecticut was affected by the New England banking crisis. Several news items focus on the 
problems surrounding Bank of New England. The media criticize regulators for lax supervision. 
Other news items highlight poor performance of the banking industry, reflected in rising loan 
loss reserves, dividend cuts, and banks raise capital under regulatory pressure.   
Florida (3
rd
 July 1992) 
Party control  
Governor: D  Party control upper and lower house: Split between R and D 
Legal provision  
Transfers by banks and other acts in contemplation of insolvency. 
 
(1)  Any and all transfers of the notes, bonds, bills of exchange, or other evidences of debt 
owing to any bank or trust company or of deposits to its credit; all assignments of 
mortgages, securities, or real estate or of any judgments or decrees in its favor; all 
deposits of money, bullion, or other valuable thing for its use or for the use of any of its 
stockholders or creditors; and all payments of money to either, made after the commission 
of an act of insolvency or in contemplation thereof made with a view to the preference of 
one creditor to another shall be void.  
(2) Unsecured claims for payment against any financial institution shall have the following 
priority for any distribution made after July 3, 1992:  
(a)  Expenses of the liquidation or the receivership estate;  
(b)  State claims;  
(c)  Approved claims for a "deposit," as that term is defined in 12 U.S.C. s. 1813(l);  
(d)  Approved claims for other general creditors;  
(e)  Approved claims for obligations subordinate to deposits and other general liabilities; 
and  
(f)  Shareholders' claims in proportion to the stock held by them respectively or their 
interest therein as appearing.  
(3) Except in any action brought by the department, no attachment, injunction, or execution 
shall be enforced against such financial institution or any of its property before final 
judgment in any suit, action, or proceeding in any state or federal court. 
. 
Further particulars and coinciding factors 
Several media sources report on improved bank performance in terms of higher earnings and 





 June 1987) 
Party control  
Governor: D  Party control upper and lower house: D 
Legal provision  
Priority of expenses and claims. In the event of the insolvency or voluntary or involuntary 
liquidation of any bank under this chapter, the expenses and claims shall have priority in the 
following order: 
(1) Administrative expenses; 
(2) Unsecured claims for wages, salaries, or commissions, including vacation, severance or 
sick leave pay, earned by an individual within ninety days before the date of the 
commissioner’s position in and amount not exceeding $,2000 for each individual. 
(3) Claims of depositors. Any corporation guaranteeing or insuring the deposits is 
subrogated to all rights of the owners of such deposits to the extent of payment. The 
right of any agency of the Unites States insuring depositors to be subrogated to the 
rights of depositors upon payment of their claims may not be less extensive than the law 
of the United States requires as a condition of the authority to issue such insurance or 
make such payments to depositors of national banks; 
(4) All other unsecured claims in amounts allowed by the court, including claims of secured 
creditors to the extent the amount of their claims exceed the present fair market value of 
their collateral, the claim of a lessor for damages resulting from the termination of a 
lease of property may not be allowed in an amount in excess of the rent reserved by the 
lease, without acceleration for sixty days after the lessor repossessed the leased 
property, or the leased property was surrendered to the lessor, whichever first occurs, 
whether before or after the commissioner took possession of the institution, plus any 
unpaid rent due under the lease, without acceleration, on the date of possession or 
surrender. A claim for damages resulting from the termination of an employment 
contract, may not be allowed an amount in excess of the compensation provided by the 
contract, without acceleration, for ninety days after the employee was directed to 
terminate or the employee terminated performance under the contract whichever first 
occurs, whether before or after the commissioner took possession of the institution, plus 
any unpaid compensation due under the contract, without acceleration, on the data the 
employee was directed to terminate to the employee terminated performance. Claims 
for damages resulting from the termination of employment contract of persons who 
were in control of the institution are not entitled to priority under this subsection; 
(5) Claims for debts that tare subordinated under the provisions of a subordination 
agreement or other instrument; 
(6) Claims of depositors who are controlling persons; 
(7) Claims of persons who were at any time in control of the intuition; 
(8) All other claims.  
Further particulars and coinciding factors 
News items focus on the islands’ dominant bank, Bancorp Hawaii, which is prospering and 





 July 1985) 
Party control  
Governor: D  Party control upper and lower house: R 
Legal provision  
Receiver to take charge of assets; order of payment. 
 
(a)  A receiver appointed pursuant to K.S.A. 9-1905 and amendments thereto, under the 
direction of the commissioner, shall take charge of any insolvent or critically 
undercapitalized bank or trust company and all of its assets and property, and liquidate the 
affairs and business thereof for the benefit of its depositors, creditors and stockholders. 
The receiver may sell or compound all bad and doubtful debts and sell all the property of 
the bank or trust company upon such terms as the district court of the county where the 
bank or trust company is located shall approve. The receiver shall pay over all moneys 
received to the creditors and depositors of such bank or trust company as ordered by the 
commissioner 
(b) In distributing assets of the insolvent or critically undercapitalized bank or trust company 
in payment of its liabilities, the order of payment, in the event its assets are insufficient to 
pay in full all of its liabilities, shall be by category as follows: 
(1) The costs and expenses of the receivership and real and personal property taxes 
assessed against the bank pursuant to applicable law; 
(2) claims which are secured or given priority by applicable law;  
(3) claims of unsecured depositors; 
(4) all other claims exclusive of claims on capital notes and debentures; 
(5) claims on capital notes and debentures. 
 
Should the assets be insufficient for the payment in full of all claims within a category, such 
claims shall be paid in the order provided by other applicable law or, in the absence of such 
applicable law, pro rata 
 
Further particulars and coinciding factors 
There are no notable news items in the media about banks in Kansas.  
Louisiana (1
st
 January 1985) 
Party control  
Governor: D  Party control upper and lower house: D 
Legal provision 
Distribution of assets 
A. All claims against the bank's assets, proved to the receiver's satisfaction or approved 
by the receivership court shall be paid in the following order: 
(1)Administration expenses of the liquidation. 
(2)Claims given priority under other provisions of state or federal law. 
(3)Deposit obligations. 
(4)Other general liabilities. 
(5)Debt subordinated to the claims of depositors and general creditors. 
(6)Equity capital securities. 
 
Further particulars and coinciding factors 
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There are no notable news items in the media about banks in Louisiana.  
Maine (16
th
 April 1991) 
Party control  
Governor: R  Party control upper and lower house: D 
Legal provision 
Procedures in liquidation.  
When the superintendent appoints the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation as receiver, 
federal law prescribes the procedures that the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation 
follows in liquidation of the insolvent bank. When an insolvent stock institution or an 
insolvent mutual institution is liquidated, assets must be distributed in the following 
priority: 
A. First, the payment of the costs and expenses of the liquidation: 
B. Second, the payment of claims for deposits, including, but not limited to, the claims of 
depositors in a mutual institution for the return of their deposits; 
C. Third, the payment of all debts, claims and obligations owed by the institution and not 
accorded priority pursuant to paragraphs A and B; 
D. Fourth, the payment of claims otherwise proper that were not filed with the prescribed 
time; and 
E. Fifth, the payment of any obligation expressly subordinated to deposits and to claims 
entitled to the priority established by paragraphs A and B. 
Further particulars and coinciding factors 
There is an emergency preamble which highlights that supervisory powers are to be enhanced  
to deal with presently volatile economic conditions which warrant prompt responsive action by 
the Superintendent of Banking. Acquisitions may also be facilitated by determination of the 
Superintendent of Banking if he deems this is important to protect depositors.  
Maine was affected by the New England banking crisis. Several press items focus on the Bank 
of New England and problems in the real estate market. 
Minnesota (24
th
 April 1990) 
Party control  
Governor: R  Party control upper and lower house: D 
Legal provision 
Subd. 9.  [DIVIDENDS ON CLAIMS.] At any time after the expiration of the date fixed for 
the presentation of claims the commissioner may, out of the funds remaining on hand after 
the payment of expenses and amounts due to depositors, declare one or more dividends, and 
after the expiration of one year from the first publication of notice to creditors, may declare 
a final dividend, such dividends to be paid to such persons in such amounts as may be 
directed by the district court.   
Further particulars and coinciding factors 
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A small number of news items indicate improved performance of Minnesota based banks.  
Missouri (15
th
 May 1986) 
Party control  
Governor: R  Party control upper and lower house: D 
Legal provision 
Claims entitled to priority, liquidation or insolvency. – In case of the insolvency or 
voluntary or involuntary liquidation of any corporation to which this chapter is applicable, 
the following claims shall have priority in the order herein specified: 
(1) All unpaid charges lawfully assessed against it by the director and all unpaid penalties 
and forfeitures incurred by it under any section of this chapter, and all expenses of 
liquidation; 
(2) The depositors having an approved claim against the general liquidating account of the 
bank; 
(3) The general creditors having an approved claim against the liquidating account of the 
bank; 
(4) The claims otherwise proper which were not filed within ghe time presecribed in this 
chapter;  
(5) The stockholders of the bank.  
Further particulars and coinciding factors 
There are no notable news items in the media about banks in Missouri.  
New Hampshire (10
th
 June 1991) 
Party control  
Governor: R  Party control upper and lower house: R 
Legal provision 
Distribution of Assets. Payments of dividends under RSA 395:19 and any other proceeds of 
the property of a closed or insolvent New Hampshire depository institution shall be 
distributed according to the decree of the court in the following priority: 
I. The payment of the costs and expenses of the liquidation. 
II. The payment of wage, salary and other claims of employees to the same extent such 
claims would be accorded priority under federal bankruptcy law. 
III.  The payment of claims for deposit accounts including but not limited to "deposits" as 
defined in 12 U.S.C. section 1813(l), or as it may be later amended from time to time. 
IV.  The payment of liens accorded priority under New Hampshire law. 
V.  The payment of all debts, claims, and obligations filed in accordance with RSA 
395:13, not accorded priority in the preceding paragraphs. 
VI.  The payment of delayed claims in accordance with RSA 395:16. 
VII.  The payment of capital debentures issued under RSA 384:14-a and any other 
obligations expressly subordinated to deposits and to claims entitled to the priority 
established in the preceding paragraphs. 
VIII. Any funds remaining shall be divided in the case of a stock institution among the 
stockholders according to their respective interests or, in the case of a mutual 
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institution, among the depositors in proportion to the respective amounts of their 
deposits. 
IX.  Interest shall be given the same priority as the claim on which it is based, but no 
interest shall be paid on any claim until the principal of all claims within the same 
class and all higher-priority classes have been paid or adequately provided for in full. 
 
Further particulars and coinciding factors 
New Hampshire was affected by the New England banking crisis. Newspapers report on 
declining bank earnings, and woes about banking problems are increasing. Several news items 




 July 1987) 
 
Party control  
Governor: D  Party control upper and lower house: Split between R and D 
Legal provision 
Priority of expenses and claims.  
 
The order of paying the expenses of and claims against an insolvent bank is: 
1.  Administrative expenses, including salaries and expenses of receivers 
pursuant to section 6-07-20, and expenses incurred by the commissioner 
during possession or in the course of proceedings under this chapter 
including the compensation of deputy examiners, agents, and clerks 
employed by the commissioner and reasonable fees for BANKS AND 
BANKING CHAPTER 108 267 
2. counsel, accountants, or consultants employed by the commissioner or on 
the commissioner's behalf; Unsecured claims for wages, salaries, or 
commissions 
earned by an individual within ninety days before the date of the 
commissioner's possession in an amount not exceeding five thousand dollars 
for each individual; 
3.  Claims of depositors, except that notwithstanding sections 6-03-67 and 41-
04-27, if a depositor is indebted to an insolvent bank, the insolvent bank has 
a right to setoff against the depositor's account; 
4.  All other unsecured claims and claims of secured creditors to the extent the 
amount of their claims exceeds the present fair market value of their 
collateral; 
5.  Claims for debts that are subordinated under the provisions of a 
subordination agreement or other instrument; and 
6.  Equity capital of shareholders. 
 
Further particulars and coinciding factors 
There are no notable news items in the media about banks in North Dakota.  
Rhode Island (8
th
 February 1991) 
Party control  
Governor: D  Party control upper and lower house: D 
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Priority of claims – Federally insured financial institutions or credit unions. – In a receivership, 
or a conservatorship under chapter 11 of this title, of a financial institution or credit union 
whose deposits are insured by the federal deposit insurance corporation, the national credit 
union administration or any other agency or instrumentality of the United States, the allowed 
expenses and claims against the financial institution or credit union shall have priority in 
receiving distributions, out of the assets of the financial institution or credit union in the 
following order:  
(1) The payment of costs and expenses of the administration of the receivership estate.  
(2) The payment of claims for "deposits", as that term is defined in 12 U.S.C. § 1813(I), 
including, but not limited to, the claims of depositors in a mutual savings bank for return 
of their deposits.  
(3) Unsecured claims of any local, state, or federal taxing authority entitled by law to 
priority in distribution from the receivership or conservatorship estate, to the extent of 
such priority.  
(4) Claims of salaried employees of the financial institution or credit union for wages or 
salaries earned but unpaid as of the commencement of the receivership or 
conservatorship.  
(5) Claims for all other general liabilities not specified herein.  
(6) Claims otherwise proper that were not filed within the prescribed time.  
(7) Claims for obligations expressly subordinated to deposits and general liability claims.  
  
Any funds remaining shall be paid to the stockholders of the financial institution or credit 
union, or, in the case of a mutual financial institution in which there are no stockholders, 
to the depositors in proportion to the respective amounts of their stock or deposits.  
 
Interest shall be given the same priority as the claim on which it is based, but no interest 
shall be paid on any claim until the principal of all claims within the same class has been 
paid or adequately provided for in full.  
 
Further particulars and coinciding factors 
Rhode Island was affected by the New England banking crisis. One of the main lenders in 
Rhode Island, First Financial Corp. of Providence, reports a substantial drop in earnings. Other 
news items report on poor performance of banks in Rhode Island, making them a vulnerable 




 August 1985) 
Party control  
Governor: D  Party control upper and lower house: D 
Legal provision 
Art. 4a. PRIORITY OF CLAIMS-PAYMENT. On liquidation of a state or private bank claims 
for payment have the following priority: 
(1) obligations incurred by the Commissioner, fees and assessments due to the 
Department, and expenses of liquidation, all of which may be covered by a proper 
reserve of funds; 
(2) claims of depositors having an approved claim against the general liquidating 
account of the bank; 
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(3) claims of general creditors having an approved claim against the general 
liquidating account of the bank; 
(4) claims otherwise proper that were not filed within the time prescribed by this 
Code; 
(5) approved claims of subordinated creditors; and 
(6) claims of stockholders of the bank. 
 
Further particulars and coinciding factors 
Texas experienced a series of bank failures. The state repealed its depositor preference 
provisions shortly prior to the introduction of national depositor preference in 1993 as a result of 
the FDIC's resolution of the First City banks that had been closed in October 1992.  
 

















Appendix B:  Regressions accounting for a charter time trend 
Table B.1 Accounting for a charter time trend 
Dependent variable Total interest expenses Interest on deposits Interest on non-deposits 
Charter    
    
Charter*DPL -0.0002*** -0.0002*** 0.0014*** 
 (-4.05) (-4.55) (6.31) 
Bank size  0.0015*** 0.0016*** 0.0009*** 
 (12.29) (13.14) (3.47) 
Capital ratio -0.0003*** -0.0004*** 0.0002** 
 (-11.33) (-10.83) (2.31) 
Charter time trend 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0000 
 (1.35) (1.49) (-1.38) 
Bank FE YES YES YES 
State*Quarter FE YES YES YES 
Observations 199,731 199,731 199,731 
R2 0.6797 0.6855 0.0271 
Number of banks 5,509 5,509 5,509 
Notes. This table presents the results of difference-in-difference regressions examining the effect of state depositor preference law enactment on banks’ 
costs of funds. We estimate 𝑦𝑖𝑠𝑡 =  𝛼 + 𝛽𝐷𝑃𝐿𝑠𝑡 ∗ 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖 +  𝛿𝑋𝑖𝑠𝑡 + 𝛾𝑖 + 𝛾𝑠𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑠𝑡, where 𝑦 denotes the dependent variable of bank i in state s at time 
t, which include ratios of: total interest expenses to total liabilities (Total interest expenses), interest on deposits to total deposits (Interest on deposits), and 
interest on other non-deposits to total other non-deposits (Interest on non-deposits). The main explanatory variable is an interaction between the depositor 
preference law dummy and Charter dummy variable. DPLst is a dummy variable equal to 1 for all banks in states and years following introduction of state 
depositor preference law, and 0 otherwise; Charteri is a dummy variable equal to 1 for all state-chartered banks, and 0 for nationally-chartered institutions. 
The coefficient β provides information about the effect of state depositor preference law adoption. The set of bank-time varying control variables X 
include the logarithm of banks’ total assets (Bank size), the ratio of equity capital to total assets (Capital ratio), inter- and intra-state deregulation dummy 
variables, and an S&L crisis proxy (measured as the ratio of failed thrift assets to total bank assets in the state). Additionally, the regressions include state-
quarter-fixed effects (𝛾𝑗𝑡) and bank-fixed effects (𝛾𝑖). t-statistics are reported in parentheses and standard errors are clustered on the bank level.  *** 
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
 
 
